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PREFACE
My interest in empowerment, especially in the corporate sector, arose from my curiosity
concerning the working of post apartheid South Africa. As a foreigner in South Africa,
who did not experience apartheid per se and being a black person, I have always
imagined what life was like during that period. This is because South Africans always
seem to be doing things differently from other Africans. Economic empowerment while
being at the forefront of the transformation program is something that has happened only
in South Africa. One would have thought that this sort of program would have existed in
other African states after colonialism but that was not the case. Living in this society has
always prompted me to question why certain things are not done differently.
My friends Norman Taku and Achiri Nyindem who visited South Africa from
Cameroon in 1996, talked to me about exciting new developments in law in this country.
Upon my arrival, the one big question which kept popping up in my mind was" how
does black South Africa do business with white South Africa?" I applied myself to the
study of South African law and with my interest in Business Law I started asking
myself what I would do if I were a Business lawyer. How one goes about organising a
fair deal between someone who has little or no money and one who has plenty. It is with
these questions mind I undertook this research.
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In this paper, I have attempted to highlight the problems that face investors, both black
and white, in South Africa, especially in the light of the effects of the new legislation
promulgated after apartheid was abolished. The legislation with which I am most
concerned, is the legislation which was promulgated to promote the entry ofblacks into
the South African economy.
In chapter one, I deal with the concept of empowerment from the constitutional view
point and the problem of its definition. I also discuss out the relevant new legislation that
in my argument I believe impacts on corporate activity and then deal with the distinction
between an "arrangement" within its ordinary meaning in corporate law distinct from that
as defined in the in the Companies Act 61 of 1973.
In chapter two, I deal with the dangers facing an individual investor, the benefits of
incorporation, the problem of the existence of money revolving schemes, and the effects
of a lack of education amongst previously disadvantaged investors.
In chapter three, I deal with joint ventures, their benefits, the effect of the Competition
Act 81 of 1998 on joint and potential areas of conflict between black and white partners.
Certain aspects of fraudulent and negligent conduct of directors are examined.
In Chapter four, I deal with the methods of executing mergers and acquisition in relation
to empowerment companies, their advantages and disadvantages, certain procedures
viii
necessary for the protection of investors like due diligence inquiries, the protection
offered by the present company legislation and the common law and criticisms of the
courts to protect shareholders. I look at a case study and special considerations in mergers
and acquisitions.
In chapter five, I look at the problem of capital in empowerment companies, the various
methods that have been used to raise capital, and the loopholes in the law that affect some
of these arrangements. I have focused specifically on special purpose vehicles and
buyouts.
In chapter six, I deal with the impact of government action and government policy on
empowerment and I have compared this with what has happened in other countries. I
conclude by recommending that the Black Empowerment Commission should be given
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PART1
HISTORCAL REVIEW AND BACKGROUND ISSUES
Chapter 1
In order to protect an investor from losing his investment it is necessary to limit his
liability to risks. This is done by incorporating the entity in which he intends to invest. It
is also important to take other factors that exist in the environment where the entity will
operate such as the existing government's policies and laws into consideration.
The feature of incorporation first touched South Africa in 1602 when the Dutch East
India Company first up a refreshing post in the Cape. 1This was a company was
incorporated under Dutch law by royal charter.2 Thereafter each company that operated
in South Africa incorporated under statute during the period of Dutch rule. The British
took over the territory in 1806, however the first companies legislation in this country
was only enacted in 1861.This was the Joint Stock Liabilities Act 23 of 1861 which was
base on the English Acts3. After several legislative changes we have arrived at the present
companies Act of 19734•
A major influence on company legislation and how corporate business operated in South
Africa was the Group Areas Act of 1950.5 This Act disallowed property ownership by
1 Hosten et al Introduction to South African Law and Legal Theory 1997 p879-880
2 Op cit. at 880
3 The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the Limited Liability Act of 1855
4 Various Republics enacted their own laws for example Law No 10, 1864(Natal) and Act 5 of 1874(
Transvaal). Then the Companies Act 46 of 1926 which provided a Uniform Companies Act for the whole
of South Africa.
5 Group Areas Act 41 of 1950.
designated Groups.6 These designated groups could only own property in the loca,tion
areas where they lived.?
Section 15-1 7 of the Group Areas Act dealt with share ownership by members of today's
previously disadvantaged communities8 and their rights in relation to the controlling
interests in companies. It also restricted share ownership of shares by so called
disqualified companies9 in companies that were in principle white owned companies. It
is sufficient to say that this tight restriction on share ownership and other spheres of life
by apartheid law is the producer of the demographic features with regards to the racial
divide in present day South African corporate ownership. There are hardly any long
standing black owned companies. The full effects of apartheid on the economic
development ofblack South African is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to
state that it is a fact that there is an uneven distribution ofwealth in South African society
and there is a need for redress. In order to address this need, the concept ofblack
economic empowerment was born. With the end of apartheid came the birth of the
concept of black economic empowerment.
The constitutional basis for the process of empowerment is section 9(2) of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.This clause states:
"Equality includes the full and actual enjoyment of all rights and freedom .To
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to
6 Section 9 op cit.
7 These areas were the townships or the homelands like the former Transkei and Ciskei.
8 This will mean Africans, Indians and coloured people.
9 Black owned companies.
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protect and advance persons, or categories of persons disadvantaged may be
taken".
1.1 Meaning of Empowerment.
The Black Economic Empowerment Commission was formed in 1999 under the
chairmanship of Mr Cyril Ramaphosa to define what black empowerment is and to
make recommendations on how to achieve it. Apartheid placed huge restrictions on the
economic development of Africans, Indians and Coloured people. As a result of these
restrictions South Africa has become a very unequal society in terms ofwealth
distribution. With the political changes that took place in the early 1990s and the advent
of
a new constitutional order, black economic empowerment is seen as crucial for social
stability and development.
In terms of Section 9 of the Constitution, and in order to promote equality past
disadvantages must be taken into account and preferential treatment ofpreviously
disadvantaged is permissible lO• The definition ofblack economic empowerment has been
the subject of some considerable debate. Black Economic Empowerment has been
defined as:
" The transformation of economic structures in favour ofpreviously
disadvantaged people in South Africa 11.
10 Pretoria City Council v Walker 1997(4) SA 189(T)
11 P Mthimkulu "Panel tussles with an issue blurred by lack of defmition". Financial Mail March 17 2000 p
60
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This process started in South Africa in 1994. Such a wide definition as the one set out
above involves an endless range of issues. With regard to the topic of this paper I will
confine myself to the process of share ownership or the process of
acquiring shares, the control of companies by shareholders and shareholder rights,
minority protection and such other issues relating to the mechanism ofprofit and power
control in corporate law taking cognizance of other stake holders12• The reasoning behind
this is that it has been argued that empowerment goes beyond just ownership to decision
making and strategies13 . It has also been suggested that decision making skills can cost
the company by way of its performance and that skills cost money to develop14.
The acquisition of shares in order to obtain a stake in a company cost money. To obtain
control of a company, one must possess shares in it. As Blacks do not have the wealth to
buy shares in companies, they need to be financed. If they are not financed, they cannot
acquire stakes in companies hence they cannot control the companies since share
ownership and control are inextricably linked15. Even if black people are financed to own
shares there is a problem regarding skills. In South Africa, black people were deprived
of the education and opportunity to acquire the skills necessary for running businesses.
In this paper, I shall attempt to highlight the difficulties blacks and black business entities
face in the new South Africa. I shall also look at the problems those who do business
with them face from a legal stand point and potential problems that might arise.
12 Other stakeholder are employees and society.
13 B Headbrush "Funding Methods must be reconsidered Business Report," Natal Mecury May 102000
plO
14Anonymous "Empowerment is about taking decisions" Natal Mecury 10 may 2000 p 12.
IS The [mance here is not from the company in which shares are acquired as this is illegal in terms of
section 38 of the Companies Act but rather from fmancial houses.
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1.2 Relevant new laws and the possible impact of these laws on corporate activity.
Two legislative innovations of 1998 I suppose will and has stimulated vigorous activity
in the corporate sector. These are the Employment Equity Act16 and the
C .. A 17ompetltlon ct .
1.2.1 The Employment Equity Act.
The Employment Equity Act was designed to promote equality as prescribed by section
9(2) of the Constitution. With regards to the topic at hand, its influence is seen in the
promotion of affirmative action. 18 In terms of this Act, designated employers19have to
cater for, inter alia, the promotion, protection and training of previously disadvantaged
people based on an employment equity plan 20 . Failure to comply with the requirement
of creating an employment equity plan can lead to a fine the minimum of which is R500
16 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
17 Competition Act 89 of 1998
18 Chapter 3 of the Employment Equity Act.
19 Section 1 of the Employment Equity Act 1998 defmes a designated employer as one who employs 50 or
more employees or one with annual turnover above R2 million for argriculture,R7.5 m for mining and
quarrying, RI0m for manufacturing ,electricity gas ,water, transport storage and communication, fmance
and business services, R5million for construction, catering ,accommodation and other trade, community
social and personnel services, or a municipality as defmed in chapter seven of the 1996 Constitution, or an
organ of state as defmed by section 239 of the constitution excluding the defence force, the army the
intelligence and Secret services or an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or
31 of the labour relations Act 1995 to the extent to which they are bound by the collective agreement
20 Section 20 of the Employment Equity Act.
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000.
What is of concern to investors is whether those who should be promoted have the
relevant skills to do these jobs so as to ensure a productive enterprise exists and if not
whether they can finance the training of such staff. Because the search for skilled staff in
previously disadvantaged groups is fierce and difficult, successful black owned
enterprises, it is submitted, are potential targets for bigger white owned firms for mergers
and acquisition to fulfill their emploYment equity requirements. This submission is
further supported by the fact that apart from encouraging the affirmative action, the
EmplOYment Equity Act denies firms that do not comply with its requirements access to
potentially lucrative contracts for the provision of services to government.21 Section 53 of
the Act states clearly:
"Every employer that makes an offer to conclude an agreement with any organ of
state for the furnishing of supply of services to that organ of state or for the hiring
or letting of any thing
(a) must
(i) if a designated employer comply with chapters 2 and 3 of this
Act."
The ramifications of this clause are enormous. This will for example mean that a
construction company that has not complied with the tenns of this Act cannot get a
road construction contract from a municipality if it is a designated employer by virtue of
its turnover.
1.2.2. The Competition Act.
21 Section 530fthe Employment Equity Act 1998.
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The Competition Act 1998 was designed to discourage the formation of monopolistic
structures. However the Act allows for such an activity if it will lead to
"promotion of the ability of small businesses or firms controlled by historically
disadvantaged persons to become competitive,,22.
It seems this is a window for a white firm prohibited from the monopolistic practices
in terms of the Act to bring in affirmative action partners. White controled companies
will be able to argue that the merger should be allowed on the basis that this will
promote the interests of its affirmative action partners. In that way such "control" by
way of corporate structures can be easily created and used.
If the Competition Commission or tribunal had to undo such a scenario then it
will have to lift the corporate veil from time to time which is difficult to d023 .
The competitions Act seems to anticipate the fact that there will be a wave ofmergers
and acquisitions activity as a result of the impact of the Employment Equity Act.
Hence new wave of mergers and acquisition activity is taking place with a lot ofblack
empowerment companies as targets or at least participants. It is submitted that in order to
comply with the requirements of the Employment Equity Act, having a black partner is
beneficial. If the Act is strictly enforced it will motivate the cause for mergers and
acquisitions. The provisions of the Competition Act 1998 are also a stimulant.
13 Meaning of "arrangement".
22 See section 3(b) (ii) of the Competition Act 1998
23 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Goldmining Co Ltd 1921AD 168 at 194-195
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The phrase 'scheme of arrangement' as used in the corporate law context is usually
associated with' compromise'. This is so because a scheme of arrangement is one of the
frequently used methods for takeovers when a target company is facing liquidation.24
Such a method of taking over is dealt with under Section 311 of the Companies Act 1973.
Although I intend dealing with such a method of takeover subsequently in this
paper I do not intend to limit the meaning of the word' arrangement' within the bounds
contemplated by 311 . For the purpose of this topic an arrangement
will mean any reorganisation of share capital of a company ie any scenario that touches
on the rights and or obligations of a company or its members or its creditors. This
definition is the description given by Coetzee DJP in Ex parte NBSA Centre Ltd25
24 PM Meskin et al Henochsberg on the companies Act 5th ed 604
25 1987(2) SA783 at 787.
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PART 2
THE BUSINESS OF INVESTING.
Chapter 2
2.0 Introduction to the climate in the empowerment world.
The main purpose of this paper is to consider ways of limiting the risks involved in
investing. These companies (the black owned companies) are protected
companies that enjoy, protection policies and legislation by virtue of their
stakeholders being members of previously disadvantaged groups. If it is not possible
to limit the risks then investors should at least be aware of them.
There are various methods available to a person who wishes to invest. These include,
depositing money into a savings account to gain interest, putting money in investment
trusts and other more sophisticated models such as buying shares in companies, or
starting up new businesses as sole proprietors or close corporations.
I will limit the aforementioned by saying that whatever the method an individual
chooses to use hel she should be reasonably satisfied that the entity to which the
money goes should be what it purports to be and is not some sort of seam. An example
of such a seam in the corporate world are Ponzi schemes26.
A Ponzi scheme is a scam whereby a company allots shares and these shares
continuously change hands by promoting to clients the fact that they offer a high return
of investment usually attractive while in reality they do not offer any return of
investments at all, except for a small number ofpeople, usually the promoters who eam
26 Ponzi schemes are generally known as pyramid schemes.
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rip of money from sums put in by the later investors. A perfect example is the
empowerment scheme called Miracle 200027 .
It is suspected that a number of such schemes do exist in the country at this moment
28
.To
be able to criticise the Miracle 2000 scheme, it is necessary to look at earlier ponzi
schemes.
In 1996 an investigation was carried out by the Business Practices Committee of the
Department of Trade and Industry. This investigation was in terms of Section 8(1)(b) of
the Harmful Business Practices Act of 198829into money revolving schemes ( another
name for ponzi schemes).This investigation was done on the Newport Business Club
which was alleged at the time to be one of such schemes.
The Business Practices Committee30 discovered that this entity had lured individuals to
pay money into it with the hope of a high return of investment within a month. Each new
member was expected to bring three additional members before collecting the so called
return on investment. Each new member also had to pay a joining fee. The return of
investment received by the old members was in essence what the new members had paid.
In order for such a scheme to survive it has to keep bringing in new members in
order for old members to receive any "return" on investment. This is not possible and the
scheme must collapse eventually. When the Newport Scheme was stopped, 60% of its
members lost their money. The problem with such a scheme is that there is no new
27 S Theobald "Watch out for sinking rafts" Financial Mail July 28 2000 at 36
28 Ibid
29 Report No 76 Government Gazette No 20169 of 9th June 1999.
30 The Business Practices Committee is now known as the Consumer Affairs Committee or GAFCOM.
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wealth creation. "Old" members receive their money from "new" members and
eventually (sometime depending on the numbers) there are insufficient people to continue
joining, for such a scheme to continue working.
Section 1 of the Harmful Business Practices act defines a harmful business practice as
one which directly or indirectly has or is likely to have the effect ofharming the
relationship between business and consumers unreasonably. After the investigation into
the Newport scheme was completed, the Business Practices Committee recommended to
the Minister of Trade and Industry that these schemes should be declared a harmful
business practice and illegal. This is in terms of section 12(1) (b) of the Harmful Business
Practices Act 1988.
In Notice Number 1135 of 1999 (section 3(2)) the minister declared money revolving
schemes or ponzi schemes illegal and a harmful business practice. It is submitted that the
Miracle 2000 Scheme is illegal and a harmful business practice as its characteristics were
the same as that of the Newport scheme. The sad fact remains that even though the public
has lost money in this scheme, some people still tried to project it as an empowerment
entity.
Criticism has come from some quarter that the manner in which some empowerment
companies were structured and managed was such that the investors may have earned
more investing in unit trusts than starting up companies as such. The view has been that
they were no more than investment trusts 31. Since this is not a treatise on individual
31 T kobokoane "Euphoria gives way to reality of the business world" Sunday Times Business Times July
302000 at 8
11
investment fonns, I proceed to look at the options open from a collective point of view
which will include either starting a new entity, getting into joint ventures, mergers and
acquisitions and schemes of arrangements.
2.1 The Unprotected Investor.
Empowennent to many proponents is thought of as the process ofpassing either
ownership and/or control or the one without the other to people ofpreviously
disadvantaged groups32. It is fairly common to find empowennent companies in their
own
words 'driving empowennent' by offering shares to the public in a facilitated manner to
those who had never owned shares before or had been denied the right to do S033. Such
an effort is commendable however it does come with its own problems. The majority of
the investors themselves are uneducated and yet they become investors in those
companies in their own right. The protection of any individual's rights or obligations
starts with an understanding by that individual ofwhat those rights or obligations entail.
These new brand of investors suffer a disadvantage arising from history. Without
understanding the complex issues of the arrangements between companies, shareholders
and directors, it must be questioned whether they will be able to protect themselves.
It can be argued that some members in these companies that sell them shares are
respected community leaders and may act as trustees to safeguard the rights of these
people. Should this be so it raises the question of individual or private interest versus
32 Black Empowerment Commission Draft Report page 1
33 An example is the Grand Parade Investments, see Business Day, Corppanies July 21 2000 at 9.
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public interest. It defeats the whole idea of control as a concept in corporate governance
in these situations.
The consequences of having a group of shareholders who do not understand their rights
and obligations are enormous. For example the company might change hands without
members knowing, directors may do as they please, in a liquidation scenario some
members may abandon their claims. It is because Black investors lack education in
investment matters that Ponzi Schemes like Miracle 2000 are bound to come into
existence to take advantage of this situation. The aforementioned situation can be
alleviated by education only. It is hereby submitted that a structure should be set up,
some sort of a watchdog for corporate activity with an extended function of education for
the time being. It is understood that the Department of Trade and Industry is charged with
consumer education. The Consumer Affairs Committee acts in terms of the Harmful
Business Practices Act 1988. However whether this Committee focuses on investor
education is unclear as there exist quite a distinction in the ways a consumer is protected
and how an investor is protected. An investor lays out money with the expectation of
profits and it is generally accepted that there are risks involved in losing the money laid
out. A consumer on the other hand in buying or procuring goods or services is expected
to get his the goods free of risks of losing what he/she gets and on a recognisable
supposition that the goods are suitable for their particular purpose.
2.2 Starting a new entity.
In going into business a company or an investor faces two types of risks- the business risk
13
and the financial risk.34The business risk relates in corporate law tenns to the object
of the entity. The financial risk relates to how the capital is raised and employed.
From a protection standpoint therefore one needs to limit the liability of the investor to
the entity fonned.
This is done by incorporating the entity in tenns of either the Companies Act or the Close
Corporations Act35. Once this is done the entity has a separate legal persona from its
Owners (the shareholders)36. A major challenge in the world of empowennent business is
that of capital and skill shortage37. In view of these difficulties and in consideration of the
Law38 these factors have to play an important role in the type of entities formed and how
they will be run. For example while a close corporation needs to keep accounting records
using a bookkeeper, a company has to comply with the requirements of section 286 of the
Companies Act. Apart from the complexities required in skills to implement this section,
there is also the cost of hiring professional accountants to perform this task. Furthermore
because capital is an issue for empowerment companies they will end up as
public companies in order to raise capital from the public. Some will go as far as listing
themselves on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange. Apart from listing, there exist
other difficult tasks like complying with the regulations of the Securities Regulation
Panel and other corporate governance issues. Steering these companies through these
34 K Ward Corporate fmancial Strategy 20
35 The Companies Act 1973 as amended and the Close Corporation Act 1984.
36 Section 1 of the Companies Act 1973. See Salomon v Salomon 1897 AC 22, Dadoo v Krugersdorp
Municipality 1920 AD 530.
37 T Kobokoane "Access to Capital Still Spanner in works" Sunday Time Business Times July 30 2000 at 9
38 ibid
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institutions is not easy for people without experience that is why lots of these companies
are delisting and unbundling39 .Even after incorporation has occurred it does not
necessarily mean that the investor is totally protected or his liability has been totally
excluded. For example in case the entity is used to perpetuate fraud4o, illegalities or to
avoid certain undesirable consequences, the corporate veil will be pierced
41
In as much as investors seek to protect themselves against outsiders there exist the
necessity to protect themselves from the acts of the company itself, in the area of the
duties and functions of directors. With particular concern here in newly formed entities is
their ability to get directors to account for reckless or negligent conduct. Section 424(1)
of the companies Act and section 61 of the close corporation Act are instructive. Section
424(1) states:
" When it appears whether it be in winding up, judicial management or otherwise
that any business of the company was or is being carried out recklessly or with
intent to defraud creditors or any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, the
court may on the application of the master, the liquidator, the judicial manager
and any creditor or member or contributory of the company declare that person
who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the manner
aforesaid, shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability for
all or any of the debts or other liabilities as the court may direct".
In commenting on section 424(1), McLennan has taken the view that even though it is
39 T Kobokoane "Euphoria gives way to reality in the business world"supra
40 Lategan v Boyes 1980(4) SA191(T) 200-201
41 HS Cilliers et al Company Law 4th ed at 14
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difficult to succeed on this section the advantage it presents is that it gives plaintiffs
(investors) the locus standi to proceed against defendants (directors) and if successful,
execute judgement42 . This issue usually arises in circumstances where the directors have
acted intentionally or negligently. However negligence may arise from a lack of skills.
Empowerment companies and those companies that in compliance with employment
equity requirements have appointed directors from previously disadvantaged groups
which directors may not have the relevant expertise are faced with this question: Can a
director who has been appointed for or in the aforementioned circumstances on being
sued for reckless or negligent conduct successfully rely on a defence that his lack of
expertise is judicially noted? Some practitioners are of the view that a director sued
under such circumstances may well plead that but a court will have difficulty accepting
such a standard43 . However he qualified this opinion by saying that should loss arising
out of his conduct be suffered by creditors, the shareholders will bear responsibility for
appointing such a director. Even though the director may escape liability the standard of
negligence required here needs to be considered. The courts have held that recklessness
under this section must be given its ordinary meaning. At the very least gross negligence
is what will generate liability and not mere negligence44 . It has been submitted by some
authors that negligence need not arise out of foreseeable circumstances but also from
culpably unforeseen circumstances.
The internal scene becomes more complex if the negligent act or conduct is ratified by
42 JS McLennan "Reckless or Fraudulent Conduct of Corporate Businesses" 1998 SALJ 596
43 Opinion of M Jackson attorney, Cox Yeats, Durban.
44 Philotex (pty) Ltd v Snyman ]998(2) SA 138 SCA
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shareholders in a general meeting. Under the Companies Act, an action against a
negligent director will succeed even if such conduct has been ratified 45.The English
authorities on this point diverge in that if the action of the director is tainted with fraud
and is ratified a claim for damages against such a director will succeed 46. A derivative
action brought against a director for negligent action not tainted with fraud which was
ratified in a general meeting did not succeed in Pavlides v Jansen and others47 .The
English decisions have been criticised by some South African authors notably
McLennan48. The decision not to sue for wrongful acts might actually be coming from
the authors of those acts to the prejudice of minorities.
The number of empowerment companies that fail is evidence of mismanagement or
negligence by those who run them. At the end of the day this is to the detriment of
shareholders. Perhaps it the fact that some of these people are stillleaming and might
raise an estopel that the shareholders were aware of their lack of skill and expertise or
perhaps it is because the decision not to sue rests with the perpetuators themselves. In as
much as litigation is desireable against directors who conduct themselves recklessly or
negligently to protect investors, it is submitted that the fact that some empowerment
directors have never had a chance to run businesses must be weighed in their favour.
Litigation on the other hand can also have the effect of scaring potential good directors
away. This may lead to a setback in the empowerment ideals that are being sought
45 Section 266 of the Companies Act.
46 See Tempelman J in Daniels and others v Daniels and others (1978) 2 All ER 89
47 (1956) 2 All ER 518





One of the most frequently used and perhaps one of the most frequently abused methods
in the empowerment process is through joint ventures. This is because some of the joint
venture partners cannot fulfill their obligations in the relationship. For example, a
community trust which is a partner in a casino venture, which in reality may not
have the capital for such a venture. They do not also have collateral security to raise debt
capital. Their role might be that of window dresser.
A joint venture has been defined as
'an enterprise, corporation or partnership formed by two or more companies,
individuals or organisations at least one ofwhich is an operating entity which
wishes to broaden its activities for the purpose of conducting a new profit
motivated business ofpermanent duration .In general the ownership is shared
by the participants in more or less equal distribution and without absolute
dominance by one party49.
Again I must point out that as a hypothesis, the absence of skills and capital for black
owned businesses and the denial of access to lucrative contracts and operational
licences50 to White owned businesses should they not comply with the Employment
Equity Act51 is a prime stimulant for joint ventures coupled with the government's
49 E Herzfeld Joint Ventures 1989 2nd ed at 3
50 Here I make reference to the tender requirements by most Provincial Gambling Boards for the award of
casino licences, and the requirements by the South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority for
the award of the third cellular licence.
51 See note 14 for the case of designated employers.
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Redevelopment and Distribution Program. The fact that the various players are being
forced to comply with these requirements also has the tendency to create window
dressing.
Joint ventures fall into two broad categories namely incorporated and unincorporated
joint ventures. I have already dealt with the advantages of incorporation and need not
return to it for incorporated joint ventures. Where the joint venture is unincorporated, the
ordinary rules relating to partnership apply and in case ofbreach of contract or delictual
liability, each joint venture partner can be sued in their own name52•
While incorporation limits liability, the limitation of liability is not absolute. It is
submitted that new developments applying to groups of companies will apply to joint
ventures. Statutory inroads in the Companies Act 1973 now bars limitation of
liability53.Under section 424(1) of the Act a holding company in an incorporated joint
venture will not have its liability limited in cases of fraud, reckless actions or negligent
conduct. Here, the holding company will be liable as a partner, but the joint venture
vehicle will have its corporate veil pierced.
Dario Mil054 has suggested that in piercing the corporate veil for groups of companies,
provided the essentialia55 exist a partnership will be presumed to exist. The position in
the law on groups of companies, I submit, will fit in the situation ofjoint ventures
52 There are usually shareholder agreements that bind the parties as partners to the joint venture. But since
the consortia is unincorporated, it is not a legal entity.
53 Section 424(1) of the Companies Act quoted on page 15
54 D Milo "Liability of Holding Companies for debts of subsidiaries" SALJ 1998 at 329.
55 Esentialia will be contribution to the partnership, profit for the benefit of all partners.
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which are incorporated and expose their incorporated partners to external risks.
With regards to empowerment companies, considering the lack of capital and expertise in
the wording of section 424(1) of the Companies Act, it is submitted that these black
owned companies which are partners in incorporated joint ventures with white
companies will still be personally subject to the risks created by any mismanagement of
their side of the venture provided the liabilities caused by them are not merely negligent
but grossly negligent to fall within the ambit of section 424(1)56.
Despite section 424(1) incorporated joint ventures are still the way to go in view of the
stringent requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil under this section. It is
submitted that the meaning of the phrase" if it appears" in this section does not mean
that establishment of a prima facie case will suffice under this section57 . The onus on a
plaintiff under this section is still onerous. It has been suggested that this section is not
limited to financial matters only but also to other forms of liability.58
Another advantage in using it is that it places all the ingredients of a successful bidder in
the present economic climate in this country in one entity59. An unincorporated joint
venture may have little success in a bidding exercise for a license or a contract
as opposed to an incorporated one. The former in itself creates difficulties from a
contractual point ofview as to who the contracting parties are and to what extent they
will be liable for the performance for the contract. The offeree in tender situations creates
56 Philotex (pty) Ltd v Snyman 1998(2) SA138 SCA at 144
57 P M Meskin supra at 912 See Philotex (pty) Ltd V Snyman 1998(2) SA 138 SCA at144.The dicta here
suggests that a party to such proceedings must prove their case on a balance of probability.
58 Greenwood scheme v 75/2 Sundown (pty) Ltd. 1999(3) SA 480 (W)
59 The empowerment component, capital and skills.
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for himself the tiresome duty of pursuing multiple defendants for breach of contract and
complications in apportioning damages. In the case where the bid is for a license, the
problem that arises is determining who owns the license.
An advantage created in using joint ventures as a medium for investing is that it easily
circumvents the undesirable situations mergers bring with them. This, it is submitted, is
found in the employment scene. Mergers involve negotiations with unions as will be
seen below. Statute dictates that unions should be consulted6o.There are usually job
losses which cause unions to oppose such talks. Further implications in the job scene are
that it involves negotiating and paying severance packages to employees. The risks of
litigation are enormous especially under the present provisions of section 189 of the
Labour Relations Act61 . Contrary to the situation in mergers, joint ventures create
employment. Employee job security is maintained. Any necessary experts can be
seconded to the joint venture as they are projects and this can be for a short period or
specified period of time. Because most joint ventures are temporary projects, standard
temporary employment contracts or independent contractor contracts can be used for all
necessary workers62 •
A joint venture can be a good testing ground to establish whether a proposed merger will
work in the future. A potential danger for companies that get involved in joint
ventures in a horizontal situation is that it exposes the partners' intellectual property to
60 Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 1995.
61 The Labour Relations Act 66ofl995.
62 The difference between an independent contractor and an employee is that independent contractors are
not covered by the Labour Relations Act 1995 whereas employees are.
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each other as workers work in close proximity to each other. Confidentiality may easily
be breached and trade secrets passed on unknowingly from one company to another
which in future can lead to the delict ofpassing off. Also noteworthy is that during a joint
venture, intellectual property may be developed. How that is dealt with at the end of the
project must be clearly spelt out in the shareholder agreement together with
confidentiality and treatment of each partner's intellectual property.
Staff poaching may happen during joint ventures as partners have the chance to observe
each other. Proper restraint of trade clauses have to be fitted into the shareholder
agreements to deal with these situations. It is necessary for the empowerment
companies that do joint ventures with white firms to guard against this because while
these black firms do not have sufficient capital hence remuneration of their developed
staff may be a problem, the white firms that are wealthier want to attract skilled African
staff to fulfil their employment equity needs. Also the white firms must guard their trade
secrets.
In as much as joint ventures can evade some of the undesireable consequences of
mergers, they can be anti-competitive and might be prohibited in terms of the
Competitions Act 1998. Section 4 (1) and (2) of the Competitions Act 1998 states:
(1) " an agreement between, or concerted practice by firms, is prohibited if
(a) it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and it has the effect of
substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market, unless a party to the
agreement, concerted practice ,or decision can prove that any technological
efficiency or pro-competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect; or
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(b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices:
(i)directly or indirectly fixing the purchase price or selling price or any other
trading condition;
(ii)dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers territories or specific
types of goods or services ;or
(iii)collusive tendering.
(2)An agreement to engage in restrictive horizontal practice referred to in (1) (b)
is presumed to exist between two or more firms if
(a) anyone of those firm owns or a substantial shareholding, interest or similar
right in the other, or , they have at least one director or substantial shareholder in
common; and
(b) any combination of those firms engage in that restrictive horizontal practice".
Horizontal joint ventures involve partners on the same level of supply or production or
doing the same or similar business. Joint ventures like mergers are out to produce
synergies. However though some joint ventures are of a temporary nature, others are for
much longer periods.
It is submitted that joint ventures (usually having underlying contracts or shareholder
agreements between joint venture partners who may be companies themselves) have the
effect of substantially lessening competition between partners who would otherwise have
been competitors63 . These cartels or monopolies created as such will fall within the
63 V.Korah et al EC Competition Law and Practice 4th ed 1990. As early as 1964 the United States Supreme
Court in US v Pen/Dlin (1964) 378 US. 158 had recognised the fact that a joint venture could bring about
anti trust properties, a lacunae conspicuously absent in the 1998 Competition Act. A similar provision
against joint ventures seeking to restrict competition is also found in Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome
governing competition issues with regards to joint ventures.The only notable exceptions to joint ventures
are markedly in the field of research and developments (Article 85(3) ) and even so limitatons exist.
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prohibited practices of Section 4(1) and (2) of the Competitions Act.
By incorporating into a single unit, partners in a joint venture sell at a single price or
provide services at one price reducing the number of suppliers. As such, 4(1) b (1) and (ii)
are contravened.
Ifthe'controllers of a particular tender do not expressly state in the tender requirements
that each player shall participate in one tender alone, it is possible to find bidders in other
joint ventures thereby colluding contrary to section 4(1 )(b) (iii).
The presumption introduced in section 4 (2) can hardly be a rebuttable presumption in
terms of a joint venture. This subsection makes reference to any combination of firms
engaged in a restrictive horizontal practice. Most joint ventures will be caught by it.
Usually one finds that the directors in joint ventures are usually the same for the parent
company.
The proviso to section 10(3) (b) has serious implications. It states:
"The Competition Commission may grant an exemption .. .if-
(c) the agreement, or practices, or category of either agreements, or practices
concerned, contributes to any of the following objectives:
(ii)promotion of the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or
owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive;
It is submitted that though a joint venture with white firms might make black firms more
competitive by virtue of the fact that they gain access to capital and skills
development this provision seems to be a route for the creation of future cartels if not
carefully watched. Examples here are the Afrisun and the Tsogo Sun Groups which are
consortia that bided for casino licenses. It should be noted that there is a limited number
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of casino licenses in South Africa.64 Both groups have casino licenses in more than 5
provinces each. This means that ten of the total number of casino licenses are in the
hands of two entities alone. This must be anti competitive behaviour.
On the other hand, because of the large capital requirements to build large hotels to house
these casinos, black partners could not raise the capital by themselves and may not
necessarily have the skills to run these businesses.
In view of the number of ex- politicians heading large corporations and the number of
bidding processes that face judicial review, it is submitted that the bidding for licenses
and contracts in present day South Africa is sometimes a political affair.
3.1 Potential areas of conflict between black and white partners.
It is trite knowledge that the bidding for licenses and contracts in present day south
Africa is sometimes a political affair. Support for this proposition can be found in the
number of ex-politicians heading large corporations and the number ofbidding processes
that now face judicial review.
This has the potential to lead to conflict. When empowerment partners are brought in ,
most demand that even though they do not have the capital, they account for the goodwill
of the corporation because the white companies stand no chance ofwinning the bid
without a powerful empowerment component. They argue that apart from just being a
face, they add substantial value to the group or joint venture. An example here is the Cell
C group that was granted the third cellular license. A problem is how the empowerment
64 Section 13(1) of the National Gambling Act 1996 stipulates that only 40 casino licenses should be
awarded in the country.
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partner gets compensated for being black enabling the joint venture to win its bid
65
. In
practice most empowerment partners demand success fees as they believe they are the
generators of the companies business especially when the companies depend on licenses
and contracts. If so agreed how much should this be or how should such a compensation
be calculated or measured? Every major corporation that has put in a bid considers this a
major challenge, which still remains unanswered66.
The second instance is one ofbalancing of interests in achieving the goals of the joint
venture. Normally when empowerment partners are brought in, they are expected to
ensure that whatever the goal of the joint venture is, be it to get a license or a contract, is
achieved. There is pressure from the other partners as well as their own desire
to make money. It is alleged, for example, that the Akani Group67 has a
shareholder who is a member of the Gambling Board. If this allegation proves to be true
decision of the board to grant this group a casino license will probably face judicial
review. Lord Hewart CJ in R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy 68 said:
" justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done".
In the circumstance surrounding Akani, the decision will be reviewable on a number of
grounds namely; that there existed a pecuniary interest in a shareholder being a
member of the Gambling Board69, that there was a personal interest in the matter70 and
65 For confidentiality, interviewees cannot be cited
66 Every bidding prospectus requires an empowerment component to be part of the bid.
67 P Kirk "Casino bosses on gaming board", Mail and Guardian August 11-17 2000 at page 5.Akani is one
of the winners of the casino licenses in Kwa-Zulu Natal.
68 (1924) lKB 256
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that there was prejudice in the decision of the board against other bidders71 .It may be
necessary for the directors of the bidding company to do a background check on the
shareholders of a company that is in a joint venture to ensure that these situations do not
occur as this increases the chance of a joint venture entity loosing a bid, bidding being an
expensive process.
An issue that can easily be overlooked when an entity gets into a joint venture is insider
trading. Section 1 of the Insider Trading Act No135 of 1998 defines inside information to
mean information that is known by an insider and if exposed will have substantial effect
on the securities of the entity or its financial instrument. If the bidding for a licence or
contract by a company is not published to investors it could be insider trading as the
success of the bid increases the company's avenues to boost profits.
In terms of rule 9.1 (a) of the Listing Rules of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, a
transaction by the subsidiary of a listed company will be regarded as a transaction by that
listed company. Depending on the volume of such transaction in value, a cautionary
announcement has to be made72. If this is not done when required, insider trading could
occur and the entity concerned could face suspension, a reprimand or any of the sanctions
the JSE hands out for breach of these rules. There is also the provisions of the Securities
Regulation Code to guard against if shares in the joint venture are bought by way of
69 Rose v Johannesburg Local Road Transportation Board 1947(4) SA 272 (W)
70 South African Law Commission Report on the investigation into the court's power of review of
administrative acts pages 180 -182
7J Liebenberg v Brakpan liquour licencing Board 1944 WLD 52
72 Rules 9.3-9.33
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This is a more complex method of investing. It is the approach that has been used by
most black businessmen in the empowerment process. The investment choice often
depends on the availability of capital. It will be seen for example that schemes of
arrangements though good are usually not used as a method of acquisition due to a lack
of capital.
4.1 Methods of implementing mergers and acquisitions.
4.1.1. Schemes of arrangements.
This method of acquiring a company falls within the provisions of section 311 of the
Companies Act. There has been a considerable debate as to what constitute an
arrangement and what does not73.Various authors and judges agree that what constitutes
an arrangement under this section is wide, the only limitations being a scheme
authorising something ultra vires a company or something illegal or unacceptable in
law.74In the words of Friedman and Wilson JJ in Ex parte Strydom NO: In Re Central
Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty) Ltd75 a scheme
73 PM Meskin Henochsberg on the companies Act supra at601
74 ibid
75 1988(1) SA616 at 619H-I
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" reduced to its simplest form, amounts to no more no less than this. The offeror
makes the following proposal to the company. 'I am available to make a sum of
money available to you to distribute equally amongst your creditors and validly
cede their claims to me. If you arrange this, I will then release you from
liquidation and permit you to continue to trade".
Simply put, in a scheme of arrangement a proposer makes a proposition to a company
asking the company to agree with its creditors, or its shareholders or as the case might be
to pass over their claims or rights to shares to him, the proposer, for a consideration.
In terms section 311(2)(a) three fourths of the shareholders or class of shareholders or
creditors or class of creditors must agree with the company before a court can sanction
this to make it binding. It must be noted that this proposal must be made to the company.
The company makes the necessary arrangements with its creditors or shareholders to free
itself from its liabilities and not between the proposer and the creditor.76 This view has
been endorsed in the Cape77and in NataC8• It does not however mean that a scheme of
arrangement can only take place when a company is in financial difficulty. It can take
place even where a company is in a sound financial footing, provided the offer being
made to the shareholders is enticing enough.
76 A full bench of the Witwatersrand Local Division rejected such a scheme as not falling within the ambit
of section311 see Ex parte Kaplan and others NNO: In re Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd
1987(3)SA413(w)
77 Ex Parte Milman and others NNO" In Re Multi-Bou(pty) Ltd and others 1987(4)SA 40 ( C)
78 Ex parte Strydom supra.
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4.1.1.1 Procedure.
To implement a scheme of arrangement the proposal should be prepared, and it is brought
before the High Court as an ex parte application, if the judge is satisfied that the relevant
parties whose interests are to be affected by his order have been notified and that
sufficient information been made available to the creditors or shareholders he will order
a meeting of shareholders. The offer or proposal is then placed before the creditors or
shareholders as the case may be together with all the relevant information for them to
consider the offer and make a decision whether to accept the offer, reject it, or make a
counter offer to the company79.
Of particular importance is that the explanatory report accompanying the proposal
should be of sufficient detail as to enable the parties concerned to get a clear picture of
the alternatives before them. I will deal with the content of the explanatory note
subsequently. The number of scheme meetings and the chairman of those meetings must
be decided by the court. If the required number of shareholders or members making three
quaters of the total number required agree to the scheme, the chairman
reports to the court by way of an affidavit. The scheme will be sanctioned by the court
and upon being sanctioned the report is filed with the Registrar of Companies and only
then does the scheme take effect8o•
4.1.1.2 Content of the proposal and guidelines for making them.
79 SeeSection 311 of the Companies Act.
80 Section 311(2)
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There has been some discussions as to what the proposal for a scheme should contain.
This issue was discussed at length by Stegman J in Ex parte Lebowa Development
Corporation Ltd.81 Because this paper is based on the protection of investors, I submit it
is extremely important to deal with the issues that were raised by the learned judge and
the various criticisms that have been leveled against some of the points raised. He set out
the content to be as follows:
1.The proposal should be clear and comprehensible to the ordinary man.
This point has been criticised by Larkin on the grounds that the court should not set such
standards82 • With respect, I disagree with the learned author. In the present South African
business scene we have people from previously disadvantaged background who will not
be able to follow a complicated argument and difficult language by lawyers. It does not
help an investing group of individuals if they cannot understand a proposal being made
to them simply because it is not clear. It might cost an unsophisticated investor money
just to get to the bottom of what the proposal is. With respect, I agree with the learned
judge on this point.
2. The proposal or arrangement must embody a compromise or arrangement as envisaged
by section 311 of the Companies Act.
I hereby refer to the earlier point made that the proposal should be made to the company
not the creditor. Ifit is made to the creditors of the company or shareholders directly, it
might just be a cession which will be incorrect in that it leaves out the company whose
81 1989(3)SA 71
82 MP Larkin "Compromise" Annual survey of South African Law 1989 at 237.
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rights are affected83 . As was rightly pointed out in the Strydom Case for example the
proposer may not be in a position to know all the creditors and may leave some
out.84Secondly in the case of shareholders, the articles of the company as a contract
binds the company and the shareholders. If the proposer deals with the shareholders
directly without the company, whatever rights that exist between the shareholders and
the company are not affected.
3. It must be probable that the majority of the agreed conditions of the scheme will
be fulfilled.
Goldstone JA ruled in the appellate division (as it then was) that it will be
improper for the court to dictate what is in the interest ofbusinessmen85. This point has
also been criticised Larkin and Friedman and Wilson JJ on the same basis. 86
4. That Information required by creditors should be put before a court to consider its
sufficiency for the intended purpose. This point has received the endorsement of the
appellate division (as it then was)87. The worrying fact is that it seems what is considered
sufficient information may differ from one judge to another or lies in judicial discretion.
From the authorities, it seems this information is best provided by way of a comparative
analysis between the offer and other alternatives available to the creditors or shareholders
83 See Ex parte Strydom supra for criticism of the Ex Parte Kaplan Judgement of Coetzee DIP by Friedman
and Wilson JJ.
84 Ex Parte Strydom supra at 622A-C
85 Ex parte De Vi/liers NNO: In re Carbon Developments(pty)Ltd (in liquidation) 1993(1)SA 493 (A)
86 MP Larkin Supra and Ex parte Strydom supra.
87 Ex parte De Villiers supra
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like liquidation.88 It has also been held that it is necessary to show the fees payable in
both the scheme scenario and the liquidation scenario. The interests of the directors must
be reflected in the explanatory note ifpossible.
A useful check list for the explanatory note will include the following89 guidelines:
(a) A reasonable background to the company or its briefhistory.
(b) Financial position of the company stating its assets and liabilities.
(C) Comparison between arrangement and liquidation or other alternative in existence.
This should include-the administration costs
-what the secured creditors will receive;
-what the preferred creditors will receive like revenue and
employees;
-what concurrent creditors will receive.
(d) Explain the salient features of the arrangement for example
-who the receiver will be;
-what the vested assets of the company will be;
-what the excluded assets will be;
-what the proposer will pay as consideration;
-who bears the cost of the arrangement ifit fails;
-the order in which funds becoming available to the receive will be
paid;
-fact of the cession;
88 Ex Parte Strydom supra at 624 E-G




(f) The effect of the arrangement on the directors, and others
(g) Sanction by the court.
Any necessary information required by the members or shareholders can
always be demanded by them.
5 The Scheme Should have practical Merit.
One of the most criticised suggestions is the requirement for the scheme to be such
that it should have practical business merit. It was suggested in the Strydom Case that it
is not the duty of the court to take decisions for business people.
6 It should not be such that the court cannot approve it.
This relates to any illegal, irregular or ultra vires provisions in the proposal.
When a court has summonsed a meeting of shareholders after such a meeting, the
appointed chairman of the meeting of shareholders or creditors has to report back to the
court on the meeting. Margo J made a point in Bowman NO v Leicester Diamonds(pty)
Ltd 90 that the sanctioning by the court of a scheme is not a mere formality. His lordship's
view is that other factors like better offers, terms of payment, financial standing of the
proposer and obj ections to particular provisions of the proposer may cause a scheme to be
rejected. This brings to the forefront the importance of the chairman's report to the court.
In the above matter the court prescribed the following guideline for the contents of a
chairman's report:
90 1983(2) SA 81 at 82F
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1. Details of number of creditors present in person
-number represented by proxy
-values of each of their claims
-proxies which have been disallowed
2. Report of the proceedings in each meeting on views of those favour of compromise
and those against with the justifications for various views.
3.Resolutions passed with particulars of votes for and against the resolutions and
abstentions.
4.Questions asked during the meetings with regards to merits and demerits of
compromise and answers given.
5. Details of all rulings made or directions given by chairman of the meetings.
6. Copies ofportions of documents presented to the meetings which bear on merits or
demerits of the compromise.
7. Main points of any offers of compromise should be given.
4.1.1.3 Advantages of using schemes of arrangements as an acquisition method.
The first source of difficulty in negotiating a merger is employee problems arising out of
possible litigation for unfair dismissals. When a company goes into liquidation and as a
result of that liquidation it is forced to retrench its employees this is not a dismissal as
contemplated by of section 189 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and as such the
employees are not entitled to severance pay.91 It therefore means that liquidation disposes
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of the labour disputes for the acquiring company before the acquirer comes in.
The second advantage in using this method is that the proposer is in a stronger bargaining
position to take over the company than he would have ordinary gotten the company if it
were not in liquidation. Furthermore some of the liability the target company has can be
fixed on its directors personally if they had been trading negligently as a master's
report is bound to come forward in terms of section 400(2) read with 311(4) of the
Companies Act 197392.In a situation where this method of acquisition is used, it is less
expensive to acquire the company in terms ofprice as the proposer is also able to say to
the buyer that there is much restructuring and effort is needed to turn the business around
as it is a failed venture.
The confidentiality questions raised by target companies in mergers are not over
emphasised here. However, it must be pointed out that for empowerment groups who are
just starting out and are looking at a competitive market, this is a inexpensive way of
getting a brand foot hold in a market, as usually the face of a company is the managers
and products not the owners. This easily happens when a company that had been tradding
on a popular brand is acquired by this method. The fact that claims are proven and dealt
with during compromise kills all potential litigation arising out of the past of the
company a fact that is almost impossible to cure with mergers and other types of
acquisition.
91 SA Agricultural Plantation and Allied Workers Union v HL Hall and Sons (Group Services) Ltd and
Others (1999) 201 LJ 401 (Le). Section 38 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 provides that insolvency of
the employer automatically terminates the contract of employment of hislher employees.
92 See Ex parte Lebowa Development supra.
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4.1.1.4 Disadvantages
The main disadvantage for empowerment companies for using this method is the
unavailability of capital to pay as proposers.
Secondly apart from acquiring the company good managerial skills are needed to turn the
company around from the doldrums because here one is acquiring a failed venture. This
point is only relevant where the target company is being acquired from a liquidation. The
absence of skills for empowerment companies is a factor to be considered.
The third issue here that may be a hindrance is the fact that one places one's acquisition
in the hands of a judge. The procedure for making the various explanatory statements and
reports to the courts are fairly strict and the court will not sanction any move by a
proposer if it looks unclear. Clever negotiation tactics may win the support of the
members of the company or shareholders but it is for the court to decide whether the deal
goes forward. Apart from the court there lies the difficulty of successfully persuading
three quarters of creditors to come to the decision to accept the offer. Lots of lobbying in
practice to this end, together with a convincing display to making your offer palatable are
necessary. The effect of a sanctioned scheme is that it is a contract between the
shareholders and or members and the company.93 As the effect of this scheme of
arrangement is also a take over technique that changes control in a company into the
hands of people who were not previously in control, if this transaction falls within the
threshold to form an affected transaction within the meaning of 440A(1) of the
companies Act 1973, the matter has to be reported to the Securities Regulation Panel.94
93 Cilliers et al Corporate Law 2nd ed 1992 at 456.
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From a Competition Law point of view, it appears that a scheme of arrangement
involving a company in provisional liquidation or liquidation will not be prohibited as it
will be seen to be increasing the efficiency of the business in that industry by resurrecting
a dying business.95
4.1.2. Conversion of Shares.
The repealed Section 84 of the Companies Act which provided for a reduction of share
capital was recognised as a method of acquisition of a company.96 The reason this
section was recognised as a method of acquiring a company is because control changed
hands to a person (incorporated or natural) who previously did not have control of the
company. A study of section 440 of the Companies Act indicates that the Companies
Act still recognises this route to acquire a company. Section 440A states:
" 'acquisition' in relation to securities of any company, means the acquisition of
securities of such company by any means whatsoever, including purchase or
subscription;"
Conversion of shares can take place by way of a scheme of arrangement or by way of
subscription. In looking at empowerment companies this method of takeover generates an
interesting area of dispute as shall be seen.
4.1.2.1 Procedure
94 440G of the Companies Act 1973
95 Section 10 of Competition Act of 1997
96 Firer et al Fundamentals of Corporate [mance 2nd ed at 456
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The key feature to note is that class rights are to be dealt with which may naturally
involve rights to dividend and rights to be preferentially treated should the' company go
into liquidation. The norm here will be that if the shares of the acquirer are preference
shares, those preference shares will be cancelled and ordinary shares for a consideration
equal to the value of those preference shares will be issued to the previous preference
shareholders97 • This may be fact subscription if the value of the preference shares is
higher such that a share swap leads to the allotment of new shares.
4.1.2.2 New Trends
In the advent of the period when empowerment deals were made, most empowerment
companies were financed by way of special purpose vehicles. This meant that because
they were out to create black controlled companies, these institutional shareholders took
preference shares in these empowerment companies called N shares98 that were non
voting
shares. Effectively, because the shares in these companies that were issued to the
institutional shareholders were N shares and non voting in nature control vested in the
black directors. However the financial arrangements between the empowerment
companies and the institutional investors have proved unworkable in a bearish market.99
The consequence of this on these companies is that the institutional shareholders no
longer enjoy the position they used to enjoy as preference shareholders and have now
decided to take control of these companies by converting those shares to ordinary shares.
97 Ciliers et al Corporate Law 2Dd ed 1992 at 463
98 N shares are redeemable preference shares.
99 Business Map Empowerment 2000 New Directions at 35. A bearish market exist when stock prices
continue falling.
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A further motivation why more companies are likely to be seen using this method of
acquisition is that the new listing requirements of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange
will no longer list N shares.
It would be incorrect to say that the woes of empowerment companies have come from
the markets alone. The other causes are as follows:
1. There was a notable absence of due diligence in the manner in which these companies
structured their businesses. I submit that their financial advisers are guilty ofprofessional
negligence. From a finance point of view, they should have told the stakeholders that
these companies were not going to fare well in a bearish market. A bullish
market existed in 1998 , for how long was it going to continue knowing that these deals
were structured to last for up to five years? From the political side there was a lack of
due diligence on the lawyers who patched the deals together. They were aware that a
change of government was coming at the presidential level. Certainly a change in policy
was coming on the political front. It is indeed surprising that up to election time Special
Purpose Vehicles (spv) were still being structured. A look at the present government's
policy should have indicated that a policy change that was going to affect the livelihoods
of Spys was on the way since these Spys relied on government contracts for survival. I00
2. Bad corporate governance created a poor perception of Spys. The much publicised
issue of the New Africa Investment Limited directors abusing control is just an
example. IOI The agency problem is clearly indicated in empowerment companies. The
100 Analisis of change in government affecting SPYs from Yolisa Pikie of Business Map.
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agency problem is the influence which the remuneration of directors have on their
performance. Further to this most of the benefits the empowerment partners were going
to get lay years in the future. With regards to the manner in which the relationship
between the directors of the companies were dealt with there seem to have been some
condonation of malpractices. It is believed that these directors have acted wrongly with
impunity because most of them are political heavy weights with lots of influence to
affect future deals to come. 10l Others have argued that some of the malpractices is
brought about by the fact that some of them are over committed and cannot focus
seriously on one issue103 •
This argument is true for managing director and not non executive directors because non
executive directors are not responsible for running companies. On the other
hand while appearing to be a problem, it has been noted that most white owned
businesses went for political heavy weights who would not be there to attend board
meetings. There has been some suggestion on the field that even though black directors
were appointed, they were not the ones running the show104.
4.1.2.2 (a) Controversy
During the initial tendering for contracts and licences and as is still the case a strong
empowerment component is required for a bidder to succeed in his bid. In the Spy
101B· M .usmess ap op Clt.
102 Discussions with L Gadd, Corporate Affairs manager, Thebe Investments Ltd
103 Argument by Lindiwe Gadd of Thebe Investments Ltd
104 Per Nomthle Canca ofWiphold.
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arrangement this component is clear. The control vested in that component that was the
empowerment partner. The controversy that arises is that, when the institutional
shareholders who had N shares convert them to ordinary shares and regain control of the
company the company may not be regarded again as an empowerment company as
control in it has shifted to those who were not in control during the bidding process.
It is critical to deal with this issue because these companies received contracts and
licenses because of their empowerment components and this was the social responsibility
factor of redressing the inequality created by the past.
-Apart from the faults experienced by empowerment companies by way the way they
structured and financed themselves, there exists the problem created by the market itself
by way of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange. At the time when these empowerment
deals were struck there existed the culture of nondisclosure that still exist in part. Lots of
the arrangements within these companies were kept secret. Had there been proper
disclosure rules in place the situation could have been different.
4.1.3. Acquisition of Shares and or assets.
4.1.3.1. Background
One accusation which has been leveled against empowerment businesses is that they left
the route of growing a business organically to growing it by acquisition105 . Whatever the
aims of the businessmen were, they all wanted to progress. I hereby submit that one of
the strongest reasons for their failure lay in their misunderstanding of the fundamentals of
105 ibid
42
buying shares as a method acquisition and when to buy assets. Had they understood this
many companies would not have used scarce capital to purchase stakes in companies
that were not required. In order to make an informed decision about the method to
follow prior to an acquisition, it is necessary to look at the reason for that particular
acquisition first and then thereafter the result of the due diligence inquiry. The analisis
that follows deal with the considerations empowerment entities must follow and guide
lines to carrying a decent due diligence investigations in any entities they wish to acquire.
4.1.3.2 Acquisition by the purchase of shares:
The following factors influence acquisitions by the use of shares as opposed to the
acquiring of assets.
I.Who to pay.
In a situation where the seller wants to be paid directly as opposed to the
buyer paying the company this is the route to use106. Normally this arises for companies
where directors have an influence granted by the articles of association with regards to
the payment of dividends. The reasoning here comes from the fact that in the sale of
assets, the seller is the company as opposed to the shareholders. As such payment is made
to the company as opposed to the shareholders in a sale of assets and the cash arising
from the sale is only available to shareholders when dividends are declared. The
declaration of dividends in the above mentioned instance may be a discretionary issue
which is dealt with by directors, and the shareholders may wish to avoid this.
106 PFC Begg Corporate Acgisitions at 4.7
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2. Continuity in business.
If the business has to be sold as a going concern, that will entitle the transaction to be
zero rated for VAT. Sale of shares will simply mean change in ownership. A possible
advantage here to be noted is that there is a clean break between the vendor and the
purchaser. The second issue here is the consideration of employment. The Labour
Relations Act of 1995 entitles the parties to transfer the contracts of employees from one
employer to the other provided they are done the same or similar terms and conditions
as there were with the old employerl07 . Any new condition will have to be agreed to with
the employee. l 08An employees' contract of employment are with the company and not
with the shareholders, hence a sale of shares usually does not affect employees' contracts
with the company.
3. An advantage in using this method is the possibility of transferring things that cannot
otherwise be transferred from one company to the other like recognition awards or
goodwill and licenses109. I must point out here that it works both ways here for
empowerment and white owned businesses. Some established white business and its
client base may be passed on in this way while some white company may use this as a
method of getting a license that it may not be able to obtain easily nowadays.
4. In a multi asset company, the acquisition of the company by way of shares is better
than the acquisition of assets because it minimises the risk ofomitting assets in the
process.
107 section 197
108 J Grogan Workplace Law 5th ed 1999 at 196-197
109 PFC Begg op cit and MA Weinberg et al Take Overs and Mergers 4th ed at 401 to 407
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5. The trade loses of the company can be used for tax relief if the target company has
b d· I 110een tra Ing at a oss .
It is important to note that in acquiring the target company through its shares, the target
company can transfer its liabilities to the acquiring company. Therefore the importance of
carrying out the due diligence properly must be emphasised111. If the acquiring company
is unsure of or suspects problems, this can be cured by providing warranties in the sale of
shares agreement. The due diligence exercise for acquisition by way of acquiring shares
is more intensive than that for the acquisition of assets. This is because, in the acquisition
of assets, the due diligence is centered around the assets to be acquired whereas the due
diligence in acquisition of shares involves other stake holders in the company for
example employees, the communities where the company is found by way of the
environment, operational aspects and the legal rights that may exist between the company
and other parties which may give rise to litigation.
4.1.3.2 Acquisition by purchase of assets.
The following factors affect the acquisition of assets.
1. In a situation where actual of contingent liabilities cannot be covered by warranties, the
way forward is by acquiring the assets 112. Some of such contingent liabilities may
include environmental damage and bad labour relations with worker's unions.
110 PFC Begg at 4.8
III For a full discussion on Due diligence exercises, see page 47 below.
112 PFC Begg supra at 4.8.
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2. Cherry Picking.
Where the target company has several assets and some may not be profitable, it is not
necessary to purchase the shares as this will mean acquiring those nonprofitable assets
too. This factor I submit is very relevant to note when dealing with
empowerment companies where capital is a problem. Capital should not be spent on
unnecessary assets. The new trend is for empowerment companies to be seen to be
involved at the operational level hence the necessity to adopt a constructive approach.
3.Generally an employee's contract is between that employee and the employer which in
all cases is personified by the company. With the acquisition of shares, the employment
contract remains in force. On the other hand if the assets are sold, the employment
contract remains in force as well as liability for environmental damage or
litigation with the company while these assets pass to the acquiring entity. The
acquisition of assets can be a useful way of dodging these problems. 113 In the case of
employees, those who are necessary for the running of the business can be reselected
without liability for labour relations claims towards the acquiring company.
4. Onerous provision in articles.
In circumstances where there exist provisions in the target company's articles of
association, that restrict the transfer of shares, especially for private companies these sort
of problems can be avoided by the acquisition of assets114.
5. Where the target company wants to use the proceeds of the sale to plough back at its
113 ibid
114 MA Weinberg et al Takeovers and Mergers supra at 402
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businesses, acquisition of assets is the way to go.
4.1.3.4 The Process of Acquisition
Generally whether it be for shares or assets an acquisition may start with a letter of intent,
followed by a due diligence inquiry, and pricing ofwhat is to be acquired.
4.1.3.4(a) Due Diligence exercises
If investing is like a battle due diligence investigations are like a reconnaissance exercise.
Simply put due diligence processes are investigations into the firms that investors or
other entities wish to become involved with. The absence of a proper due diligence
exercise has been acknowledged as one of the strongest reasons mergers and acquisitions
fail to meet their expected objectives. 115 The general view in practice especially here in
Kwa-Zulu Natal is that these inquiries have been done mostly by foreign investors or
companies. This practice is only just beginning here. 116 Due Diligence inquiries are also
important in other areas out of the mergers and acquisitions scene. These areas are:
1. Restructuring.
Where a company is restructuring its business, if it is to be done properly, a due
diligence inquiry is necessary. 117 In restructuring a company, jobs are lost or made
redundant, but those occupying redundant positions may not be retrenched. Contracts
may be repudiated .To get a fair assessment of the situation and the legal and commercial
115 "Why Mergers go wrong" Sunday Times Business Times July 23 2000.
116 Per S Davidson, attorney at Shepstone and Wylie Durban.
117 H Sher "Due Diligence Investigations"_ Juta Business Law Vol pPart 1 at 16.
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consequences, a due diligence exercise aimed at achieving a successful restructuring is
necessary.
2. Financing.
Some practitioners have taken the view that when third party financiers wish to syndicate
Loans, due diligence exercises are necessary. This exercise must focus not only on the
company's assets and affairs but also on the business activity that is being financed.
118
Any financier is approached for a loan of a large amount of money must carry out a due
diligence exercise. This is particularly important where the loan is to an empowerment
companies where skills shortage is a critical issue and collateral security to back up loans
is almost always absent. Conversely, empowerment entities themselves should examine
the history of some of these financial houses. A study has revealed that some of the
financial houses withdraw their support for empowerment entities in times of crisis even
where the problem was out of the control of these empowerment entities. This causes
further problems to the struggling companies l19.
3. It is said that due diligence inquiries are done prior to listing on the London and New
York Stock exchanges but hardly ever for those intending to list on the Johannesburg
Securities Exchange. 120 This is so because of the amount of detail required in these
exchanges in the prospectuses of the companies. The new General accepted Accounting
Practices (GAAP) accounting standards now demand fair valuations of companies in
118 B Baillie Mergers and Acguisitions Law Society of South Africa, Continuing Legal Education at 1
119 Business Map Empowerment 1999 report. The Bear markets led to higher interest rates that affected
empowerment companies. Some fmanciers were supportive, others pulled out.
120 B. Baillie Op cit 82
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greater detail. 121Also the new listing requirements of the JSE now require slightly more
detail from entities seeking to list than it did before as the JSE strives towards the
international best practice standards to improve disclosure. 122 I hereby submit that the
trend by both the accounting profession and the stock exchange is to move towards more
disclosure of information to the investing public and in future due diligence inquiries may
be necessary to produce prospectuses for listing on the JSE.
Having dealt with the circumstances in which due diligence inquiries are necessary it is
important to look at who does the inquiries. Traditionally, due diligence inquiries
tended to be an issue handled by accountants because it was seen as a financial issue to
be dealt with by auditors only. 123 This is really incorrect as some of the issues are outside
the financial field and need the expertise of other experts, such as specialist
lawyers, management consultants and environmentalists. 124 The International Bar
Association in its 8th Conference identified three main problematic areas namely
employment law, environmental law and confidentialityl25. It was suggested by
practitioners at the IBA conference that when taking instructions for a due diligence
inquiry, the instruction must be specific as it is a broad field. Other practitioners in
South Africa have suggested that one should not assume responsibility for areas that one
does not have expertise in.. 126
121 J Gordon "Companies Face Costly Evaluations" Business Day 27 July 2000.
122 S Enslin "New Listing Rules Released" Business Day 31 August 2000
123 H Sher op cit 81
124 Due Diligences , Disclosures and Warranties in the Corporate ACquisitions Practice .International Bar
Association Section on Business law, 8th Conference 1988.
125 Ibid
126 B. Baillie op cit.82
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4.1.3.5 Timing of the exercise.
Sher and Baillie agree that it must be done prior to the process which it seeks to give
effect to127. The reasoning by these practitioners is that if this is not done, it creates
difficulty in the negotiation process as to what consideration is appropriate depending on
whether it be a merger, an acquisition or a financing operation. This is particularly so
with acquisitions in circumstances where a source of liability is discovered after the price
of the target to be acquired has been made, or to gain any other concessions in mergers.
Secondly on the part of the seller of the obj ect in an acquisition, it gives the buyer more
of an advantage if he knows more of the liabilities involved in the acquisition over a
seller who does not as he will use those liabilities to reduce the selling price.
4.1.3.6 Object of the exercise.
Different due diligence inquiries seek to achieve different things. The focus therefore in
each inquiry should be related to the object of the inquiry. For those due diligence
exercise that precede acquisitions the object is to find out whether the company being
bought contains the target asset the acquiring company seeks to acquire and whether the
company is in good form. 128 For example if the target asset in a company to be acquired
is a license, then the person conducting the inquiry has a duty to find out that the license
127 H Sher, "Due Diligence Investigations" supra at page 16. B Baillie Mergers and Acguisition Suppra at
page 1
128 H Sher supra at page 1
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is there, that it is transferable and if it were for a particular period of time, that the time
scale has not expired. If the target asset in a construction company is a contract, he must
establish that the contract is transferable.
Other liabilities that come with the company should be dealt with by estimating the cost
of such liabilities and used to reduce the purchase price accordingly. In addition
warranties if necessary must be included in the contract of sale.
In the case where the due diligence exercise is being done to merge companies, then the
focus also extends to the operational compatibility of the companies. The of corporate
culture and information technology systems for both companies must be examined129.
In a situation where the focus is a restructuring exercise the object will also focus on the
operational side of the business, potential job losses or duplication of functions, contracts
with third parties and the possibility of breaches thereof.
Where the object of the due diligence investigation is to finance an operation then the
focus of the exercise will be on investigating the collateral security or for debt
and the viability of the deal that is being financed 130.
4.1.3.7 Confidentiality.
Most targets for mergers and acquisition are potential competitors in industry. It becomes
an unfair situation where a company after having exposed itself to an acquirer, the
acquisition or merger fails to take place. 13 1Information obtained may then be used against
129 B B 'I . 3al ee op Clt at page
130 'b'd 2I I at page
131 See 88 supra.
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the target if the deal fails.
Notwithstanding the above, the following checklist is essential as a minimum to be
investigated during due diligence inquiries132.
-The constitution of the company that is the articles and memorandum of association.
-All agreements within that is shareholders agreements and without, that is contracts
with third parties.
-Minutes of general meetings and the board of directors.
Litigation and performance history of the company.
Balance sheets.
Environmental impact assessment reports of the companies.
Title deeds and a deeds registry search.
Licenses to see whether they are current.
Tax situation with the receiver.
Recognition agreements and collective agreements with trade unions and employers'
organisations.
This list is not exhaustive and can be amended depending on the circumstances.
4.1.3.7(a) Case Study133
The Privest Group/Natal Training Centre (NTC)- Employment Law.
This case study is an illustration ofhow a company can easily loose money in a badly
handled takeover bid. It goes to stress the fact that a due diligence exercise is of such a
132 B. Baillie op cit 82. Some of these points come from her writing, others are personal representations.
133 Information obtained from Conflict Resolution Aliance, the Union which represented the employees.
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fundamental importance that prior to any commitments with the target company, it
should be done.
The Privest Group is a company involved in the business of staff outsourcing,
recruitment, training and placements, amongst other things. In 1999 it decided to acquire
NTC a training company with the aim ofboosting its training division.
As the acquiring company operated a labour intensive business, the NTC staff were an
extremely valuable asset in the target company. Prior to the conclusion of the sale of
business agreement and during the due diligence process, one of the Privest Group's
managers, seconded to be the head of the NTC division when the acquisition was
completed, issued letters of employment to certain NTC staff stating that these employees
were now Privest staffmembers and that they will be employed on the same terms and
conditions as they were employed by NTC. The acquiring company also provided
overdraft facilities in for the payment of staff salaries prior to the acquisition.
After carrying out a due diligence exercise it was discovered that the target
was in huge financial difficulties in terms of its liabilities to banks. The Privest group
withdrew from the negotiations.
During all this process, NTC went into liquidation. A dispute now arose as to who was
the employer of the 128 employees who were formerly in the employ ofNTC. It became
important to settle this question because in terms of section 41(2) of the Basic Conditions
of Employment Act 1997 these employees had to be paid severance packages and this
had not been done. In addition NTC itself was in liquidation. Finally there was the issue
of the letters issued to some employees by the acquiring company and these employees
contended that they were Privest employees and Privest had to pay severance packages.
53
The problems in this failed acquisition lay in the conduct of its due diligence enquiry.
The liabilities of the target company were not clearly established before agreements were
being made for example the decision to grant letters of employment was not supposed to
be done without establishing the terms of service of these employees under NTC.
Severance packages in terms of section 41 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
are calculated at the rate of 1 week's pay per completed year of service and therefore an
employee who has spent 10 years at NTC will get 2 and ~ months salary. The overall
cost is huge when the years of service, salaries and the total number of employees are
taken into consideration. The exclusion of their years of service logically should have
been excluded in any offer of employment. Secondly the granting of overdraft facilities to
NTC without a proper investigation of its financial situation was negligent as it later went
into liquidation forcing the Privest Group into the position of a concurrent creditor.
The dispute with the employees alone was settled out of court for approximately half a
million Rands. Just for attempting to acquire and not succeeding, this exercise cost the
Privest Group well over 3/4 of a million Rands.
This case study shows how important and how cautiously any acquirer must approach a
due diligence exercise.
4.1.3.8 Special considerations in the process of mergers and acquisitions.
I.Minority Shareholders.
In the case of affected transactions,134 if90% of the shares of the target company have
134 See section 440A( 1) of the Companies Act 1973. Transactions shifting control to persons or persons
acting in concert in whom Control did not vest prior to the transaction are affected transactions. Such
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been acquired, the minority shareholders of the acquiring entity may compel the acquirer
to purchase the remaining minority shares at the same or similar terms as those of the
majority l35. A court may compel such a sale if it is satisfied that the minority shareholder
cannot be traced even in circumstances where less than 90% of the shareholders in the
target company are willing to sell their shares to the acquiring company. 136
The issue of minority shareholders is important, particularly with regards to this paper
because most black owned companies have small stakes in large corporations as a result
of capital constraints and therefore fall within the minority. In a case where a white
owned company does an acquisition by expropriating the shares of a black owned
company in the minority, though such a company may well be within its legal rights to do
so, such a transaction may be deemed to be politically incorrect as the general tendency is
to promote black economic empowerment by ownership. 137 On the other hand even most
white owned companies placed in this situation will not be willing to acquire a minority
black stake as that will give that particular target company a black empowerment
component. Depending on the relationship between the black component and the old or
new shareholders they may be able to force the acquiring company to buy them out as it
is within their legal rights to do so while the white owned company cannot prevent the
black shareholders from selling their shares.
control does not necessarily have to be de facto. Suffice it that the control be in general meeting with voting
shares.
135 See section 440K
136 J Bellew Mergers and aguisitions 1999 Continuing Legal Education at page 28.
137 See defmition of Black Economic Empowerment at chapter I.Also see new laws that promote this
ideology. Discussions with Lindiwe Gadd Corpotate Affairs manager at Thebe Investments Limited.
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2. Directors' Role.
In tenns of section 228 of the Companies Act directors cannot dispose of the whole or
substantially the majority of assets of a company without the approval of the general
meeting. The issue of directors disposing of the assets here therefore rests on the
shareholders who appointed them to pass a resolution allowing the sale in a general
meeting by a simple majority. This concern is raised because of the method of acquisition
by assets. This must be read together with the Securities Regulation Panel rules as these
rules also control the sale of assets since the Securities Regulation Code also covers the
sale of assets. 138 Some practitioners have held the view that the SRP's power extends to
directing how votes may be cast to avoid inequity to other shareholders by either
allowing a shareholder whose vote may cause prejudice to a minority shareholder to vote
in part or refrain from voting. 139
3. The Securities Regulation Panel.
The most significant role played by the securities regulation panel is that of ensuring that
all shareholders are treated fairly whether they are in the majority or not. 140 This in
essence means that they must be provided with the same infonnation, at the same time,
that the same offer is made to them, that they are treated in good faith, and that the
infonnation supplied should be accurate. 141When a person becomes holder of 35% of the
138 See 440A( 1) for defmition of affected transaction which includes a disposal as contemplated in section
228 of the Act, namely a disposal consisting the whole or substantially the majority of assets in the
company by directors.
139 J Bellew op cit95 at page 5
140 Cilliers et aI supra at 458.
141 '11' 1Cl'Cl lers et a orporate aw at 460. SectIOn C
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voting rights of a company, that person must make those mandatory offers to all the other
shareholders in that company. 142 The offer must be kept standing and the offer must
be kept open for 21 days after the posting of the offer documents. 143 The party making
the offer must be able to implement the offer. Cautionary announcements and the
intention to make an offer must be published. The impact of the rules of the panel,
especially with regard to mandatory offers to other shareholders, is difficult one for
empowerment companies as the ability to make the offer then becomes dependent on
whether the empowerment company has the money to buy the shares of the offeree and
those of the other shareholders that are ready to sell. The offeree's minority may try to
compel the empowerment company to buy its shares. Because lack of capital is such an
issue with empowerment companies that the SRP rules only make them difficult for
these companies to participate effectively in acquisitions. Yet it is expected that
empowerment should take place by share ownership. I submit that perhaps the rules
should be amended giving the panel the power to intervene in circumstances where
mandatory offers are made. The reasoning here is based on Section 10 of the
Competition Act that allows mergers that may promote the participation in business of
people from previously disadvantaged groups.
4. Competition Law.
This has quickly become a thorn in the flesh of industry practitioners and currently one of
the fast growing fields ofpractice in commercial law. 144 The threshold for mergers that
142 Section B of the Securities Regulation Code.
143 ibid
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are controlled is regulated by the Minister of Trade and Industry in consultation with the
Competition Commission. The aim is to remove practices that lessen competition in the
market whether horizontally or vertically. 145 The main exemptions lie in the fact that the
transaction may promote exports, small businesses and previously disadvantaged
businesses, stop decline in an industry, or cause stability in any industry designated by
the minister. 146 In recent times the trend has been to run away from the clutches of the
Competition ACt. 147 To do this, recourse is made to section 3(1)(d) of the Act. This
section states that the Act applies to all activities in the Republic except, inter alia, acts
subject to unauthorised public regulation. 148 This was the argument provided by Nedcor
in their unsuccessful bid against Stanbic. They argued that their bid to merge with
Stanbic was governed by the Banks Act and not the Competitions Act and this was
upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal. Most black companies will enjoy the proviso to
section 10 (3)(b)iv of the Competitions Act.
5.The Stock Exchange.
The listing requirements of the JSE indicate that it is concerned with insider trading as
unavailability of information might lead to the prejudice of shareholders. Once an
acquisition is contemplated a cautionary announcement should be made. 149 The degree of
144 This fact can be seen in the number of mergers that have been struck down in the year 2000 for example
the Nedcor Stanbic merger, The Ellerines cases. The Competition Commission is taking a more
interventionist approach than its predicessors.
145 see section 4(1) and (2) and section 5 (1) and (2) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998.
146 See section 10(2) b of the Act.
147 Example is Standard Bank Investment Corporation v The Competition Commission( unreported)2000
148 "public regulation" has been described by section 1 as meaning" any national, provincial or local
government legislation, or any license, tariff, directive or similar or similar authorisation issued by a
regulatory authority or pursuant to any statutory authority".
58
disclosure needed is related to the volume of the transaction which is tied to how the
various cautionary announcements are to be made.
6. Unbundlings or Divestitures.
In the world ofblack owned businesses, there has not been any heavy mergers with white
owned companies though there have been acquisition of stakes. 150 But one thing that
seems to be a characteristic in black owned businesses is the tendency to unbundle. 151
This tendency is supported by the fact that most of these companies grew by acquiring
stakes in other companies. There are no real rules in the companies act for the protection
ofminorities in unbundlings. However these can be used as methods to avoid the
Securities Regulation Panel, particularly in situations where the acquiring company does
not have sufficient funds to buy out everyone. In this case the majority shareholders can
ask the company to unbundle and then sell themselves to the acquirer in a separate
arrangement.
149 Rule 9.3-9.33
150 The only exception here is the merger between Lexshell 296 Investment Holdings/Molope Group Ltd
with certain subsidiaries case No 04 /LM/JANOO www.comptib.co.za
151 Most popular example being New Africa Investment Limited
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Chapter 5
CAPITAL IN EMPOWERMENT SCHEMES
5.1 The use of Special Purpose Vehicles (S.P.V s)
5.1.1 Background
As discussed above, it was generally accepted and constitutionally enshrined that blacks
should play a role in the mainstream of the economy. One of the areas targeted was
corporate life. To do this blacks had to be in control or own a stake in the economy or be
seen to be doing so. It is a generally accepted principle in company law that control rest
in the hands of the board of directors which board of directors is elected by the
shareholders in general meeting. Voting the general meeting to create a board is logically
linked to the amount of shares owned in the company as the shareholders with the
greatest number of shares elect the majority of Directors in the board. It is also
influenced by the type of shares they own in the company. But in order to become
investors, shareholders must subscribe for shares in the company. Control of the company
also depend on the type of shares subscribed for that is preference or ordinary shares. By
virtue of the fact that the black population in the country had been marginalised and
discriminated against, the black population was in no financial position to own equity in
large corporations, let alone to such an extent as to gain control in them. It is for this
reason that various methods of financial engineering were used to place control in the
hands ofblacks in circumstances where they would not normally have been able to
achieve. It must also be remembered that under apartheid law, blacks were not allowed to
own property per se and as such could not provide collateral to secure debt capital for
business purposes even after the apartheid system was abolished.
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5.1.2 Shareholding and Control in the SPY.
These entities, now called special purpose vehicles, were first created as a financial
mechanism to bring in capital into the companies formed by black business people in a
manner that complied with the law but also safeguarding the interest of financial
institutions. 152 They are however not necessarily without risks. A normal Spy involving a
Black empowerment company has three types of shares falling into two groups. Ordinary
shares and Preference shares. The preference shares are divided into redeemable
fi h 153preference shares and non redeemable pre erence s ares.
Usually the empowerment partner holds the ordinary shares. 154 These shares give that
partner the right to vote and all other ordinary rights to dividends in the company that is
the SPV. Their risk in the company is limited to their subscribed value of shares in the
company. The Financial institutions on the other hand subscribe for the preference
shares155. It is usually a mixture of redeemable preference shares and the normal
preference shares. Redeemable preference shares earn interest just like loans while the
Spy has to pay back the interest on such shares and try to redeem them by way of
dividends. There is a fixed amount to be paid for the redemption of these shares for each
period and after the payment of the sum for the redemption and the interest, the ordinary
shareholders get a profit if there is any money left after such aforementioned payments.
Ordinarily in the traditional SPY these preference shares do not carry voting rights in
152Discussions with Dirk Kemp of Marriot Investment Bank.
153 eillliers et al at 221
154 Lindiwe Gadd of Thebe investments Ltd
155 Kemp supra
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the companyl56. Much needed capital for empowerment groups is raised when financial
institutions subscribe for these preference shares. Their position is akin to that of
creditors to these Spy save for the fact that the SPY does not grant any collateral
security, and more importantly they are able to participate in certain instances in the
making of strategic decisions of the SPY whereas a normal creditor will not be able to do
so. The result of this sort of financial engineering is that control which rests in the
hands of the ordinary shareholders is actually in the hands of the shareholder who has in
fact put less money into the company. Logically control in a company should lie in the
hands of those with more capital at risk but this is not the case here since the preference
shareholders have no voting rights in the day to day running of the company. This lies in
the hands of the elected board of directors. In the case of black empowerment
companies, directors elected by ordinary shareholders who are the black shareholders. 157
5.1.3 Limitation on control.
The control mechanisms in a company will be found in the article of association
especially when preference shares are concerned since control by shareholders come by
way of voting rights. 158Any limitations placed on the voting rights of any class of shares
will normally be found there.
Generally all shareholders have a right to vote in a company. 159 For preference shares, the
156 L Gadd supra
157 Business Map Empowennent 1999 The SPV Variant at 13
158 Section 193 and 194 of the Companies Act 1973
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law provides that this limitation may be placed in the articles except in situations
stipulated in section 194. Section 194 states:
" Voting rights of preference shareholders.-(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 193(1), the articles of a company may provide that preference shares shall
not confer the right to vote at meetings of the company except-
(a) during any period determined as provided in subsection (2) during which any
dividend or any part of any dividend on such shares or any redemption payment
thereon remains in arrears and unpaid; or
(b)in regard to any resolution proposed which directly affects any of the rights
attached to such shares or the interests of the holders thereof, including a
resolution for the winding up of the company or for the reduction of its capital.
(2) The period referred to in subsection (1) (a) shall be a period commencing on a
day specified in the articles of the company concerned, not being more than six
months after the due date of the dividend or redemption payment in question, or
where no due date is specified, after the end of the financial year of the company
in respect of which such dividend accrued or such redemption payment became
due.
The ramifications of this section are enormous especially for empowerment companies
that are using preference shares as a means for raising capital. The contention has been
that, transfer of risks leave the financial institutions powerless. However if section 194 is
considered this is untrue. An examination of section 194 indicates that so long as the
dividends of the preference shareholders are paid this sort of arrangement gives
159 Section 193
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empowennent partners control or so long as the redemption payments for redeemable
preference shares are paid, control stays in their hands. But once these payments are not
made, control swings to the hands of the financial institutions or the prefernce
shareholders then have a right to vote. 160 In Du Plessis V Utopia Vakansie -Oorde
Bpk161 the Appellate Division ( now the Supreme Court of Appeal) confinned a
decision of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court that so long as there are
dividends in arrears (or a portion of the payment for redeemable preference shares) by
law the preference shareholder then has a right to vote in general meetings
It is further submitted that control in Spys can be taken out of the hands of empowennent
partners very easily by factors in the Stock market beyond their control. Bullish
markets162 favour financial arrangements such as SpyS.163 When the market turns
bearish164 interest rates rise and the repayment of interest and dividends or installments
for redeemable preference shares becomes quite difficult. The repayment of redeemable
preference shares can only come from profits. 165 Therefore a bear market causing non
payment of dividends can transfer voting rights to shareholders ofpreference shares in
SPVs. Section 194(1) (b) has its own repercussions in SPVs. The phrase" resolution
160 Du Plessis v Utopia Vakansie-oorde Bpk 1974(3) SA 148(A)
161 ibid
162 P. Newman et al.The New Pa1grave Dictionary of Money and Finance defmes a bullish market to mean
a stock market where stock prices are moving sharply upwards and substantially enriches shareholders as a
group.
163 Business Map Empowerment 1999 Financing Challenges at 11




proposed which directly affects any of the rights attached to such shares or the interests
of the holders thereof was discussed in the Du Plessis case. Botha concludes that where
interests of shareholders are materially affected they are entitled to vote. 166 It must be
noted that the Du Plessis Case was decided based on the 1926 Companies ACt. 167 From
the learned authors's interpretation therefore, a resolution to appoint directors in a
company will entitle the shareholders ofpreference shares to vote as it materially affects
their interest. Likewise the decision apply for a loan by the directors of a company. The
argument that was raised in the Appellate Division is that a loan that is not repaid
immediately puts the assets of the company under threat if they have to be sold to pay a
debt. When the assets are sold, it affects the interest of the preference shareholders. 168In
the case of empowerment companies with financial institutions as preference
shareholders the ability to take loans for instance will automatically trigger a right to vote
if this interpretation is followed. This is especially so where their main source of capital
has been raised by the issuing ofpreference shares. It is submitted here that it appears
from the above argument that, contrary to popular belief, substantial amount of control in
terms of strategic decisions still rest in the hands of institutional investors in terms of the
law.
From a rights point of view, section 194 is the properly in built protector of investors.
The mechanism ofpreference shares has created a situation where financial institutions
apart from providing the much needed finance by way of loans can influence the way the
166 DH Botha Section 194 of the Companies Act and Utopia Vakansie_oorde Bpk v Du Plessis. De Jure
1978 page 63 at 77.
167 Section 64 quat (4) of the 1926 Companies Act corresponds to section 194 of the 1973 Companies Act.
168 DH Botha Op cit 114
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borrower of funds should use their funds so as to safeguard their money by being able to
hold equity in these companies.
Empowerment companies on the other hand have benefited in gaining access to capital
from a source they otherwise would not have as a result of them not having collateral
security in addition to the control they gain as a right so long as the preference
shareholders are paid dividends.
The control of these companies is a difficult task. The aim of financial institutions and
empowerment companies need to be spelt out properly. With the Spy mechanism, by the
placing of capital in the hands of a shareholder who bears little risk, this situation can
lead to an loss of investor's money where carelessness or poor management exist
since those in control have little or no risk at stake.
On the other hand, where market forces at the stock exchange force control as seen
above out of the hands of empowerment group, an interventionist approach from the
institutional shareholder can lead to a loss in focus of management since they have lost
their power. Once Section 194 kicks in and the empowerment goals of the financial
institutions can be easily forgotten. 169
The second issue is that even though the empowerment groups hold control without
having put in capital it is by agreement that they control. It is very easy for control to pass
where it is not intended to be which creates a situation where there is a change of
contractual terms170by external forces.
169 Factual discussions with Nomthle Canca of Women's Investment Potfolio Holdings and Lindi Gadd of
Thebe Investments.
170 Contract here refers to the articles of association which is a tripartite contract between the shareholders,
the company and the board of directors.
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5.2 Leverage and Management Buyouts.
Black owned businesses have a problem raising capital. Most of these businesses do not
have the necessary collateral security to apply for loans from banks to fund acquisitions
or other operations. These businesses resorted to the Spy model as a financial
engineering method, which has been less than satisfactory because of what has happened
to some companies. An example is Dynamo Investment Ltd which has delisted from the
stock exchange and has gone into liquidation. The failure in the performance ofblack
companies using the Spy model has led to a rethinking of that method of financing black
businesses. A new method on the horizon that is being tested is "Leverage buyouts
(LBO) and Management buyouts (MBO),,171
A leverage buyout (LBO) is an acquisition made using little or none of the acquirer's
funds but relying on the assets of the target company to support the financing of the
acquisition172. With this method, the target company's assets are used as
security to obtain a loan. This loan is the money used to pay the shareholders for their
shares in the company or for the purchase of assets of the company if the acquisition
proceeds by way of assets. The new owner of the target company now takes over the
company and repays the debt on terms stipulated in the loan agreement173.
A management buyout (MBO) on its part is the same as a leverage buyout save for the
fact that part of the acquiring shareholders are made up of top managers in the target
171 Business Map Empowennent 2000, New Directions.
172 DA Brown et aI, Financing the Acquisition; Corporate structure, fmance and operation 1986 at page 27
173 Ibid
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company or almost exclusively of these managers. 174 The fact that managers of the target
company try to acquire the company they work for generates a conflict of interest and
raises issues of fiduciary duties to the target company.175 These will be discussed below.
The financing of an acquisition by this method must take into consideration all the issues
discussed in the preceeding chapter on mergers and acquisitions. The acquirer still has to
deal with the decision whether to proceed by way of a purchase of shares or purchase of
assets176. Due diligence enquiries need to be done and minority shareholders taken care
of. When an acquisition is financed using this method, it is easier for the acquiring
company or shareholders as the case may be, to purchase assets instead of shares. This is
so because the transaction to use the target company's assets as security for the
acquisition of loan is simpler than to purchase shares.
Secondly other unseen liabilities of the target company do not pass over. These liabilities
will be in the payment of severance packages and unsecured debts. The contracts that
generate these liabilities remain with the company since it has a direct relationship with
the parties concerned. This relationship can easily be transferred by the purchase of
shares.
A potential danger that exist with the purchase of assets is that if the sale is not published
in terms of section 34 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, the sale of assets could be
voidable.
l77
Section 34 is to the effect that any sale of a part of a business must be
174 Top managers here means both directors and senior managers of the company.
175 Fiduciary duties and loyalty to the company versus a desire to purchase the company creates conflict of
interest.
176 See page ...Supra
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published in two newspapers circulating in the area where the business is carried out.
Failure to comply with this section gives creditors the right to render the sale void up to
six months from the date of the sale.
5.2.1 Special considerations when financing by MBOs
The presence of managers of the target company as members in the acquiring company
raises technical problems. There is the duty of confidentiality and there may be a conflict
of interest. The relationship between the various classes of mangers and the company are
different and impact differently with regards to the transaction. Managers who are not
directors are in fact of employees of the company. The general term managers when not
referring to a person who is of the status of a director is a business term. I78 For these
sorts of managers who are also employees, an MBO generates a problem of conflict
of interest. Bidding to buyout one's employer places a person in direct competition with
the employer which is against the common law rule that an employee should not
compete with his employer for the same business179. Here the trust relationship is broken
down and in case the takeover bid fails, the employment relationship becomes untenable.
For those managers who are directors, they owe a fiduciary duty to the company at
common law. I80 They owe this fiduciary duty because they hold the assets of the
company in their keep and have the power to act on behalf of the company. If this were
177 Creditors of the target company have the right to enforce their claims against the company making the
sale voidable.
178 Cilliers et al Corporate law at 165
179 J. Grogan Workplace Law at page 46-47. See also Premier Medical and Industrial v Winkler and
Another 1971(3) SA 866 (W)
180 Cillliers et al op cit120 at 135
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not so, they will be in a position to do as they please with the assets of the company
thereby affecting the value of the shares of the company. Because of this fiduciary duty, I
submit that they cannot act for the company any more once their intention to buyout the
company has been made as their actions, no matter how justifiable, will be deemed to be
unfair. They will be breaking a fundamental rule in natural justice ofbeing a judge and a
d b .. 1181party to a case an cannot e seen as Impartla .
The position of managers and directors as insiders of the target company raise issues of
fairness with regards to other bidders. An outsider who is also bidding for the same
company is not in the same position as a an internal manager to know what the company
is like internal as the managers who are part of the acquiring team. Infact these managers'
unique situation can lead to insider trading. Section 1 of the Insider Trading Act 135 of
1998 defines an insider as
" an individual who has inside information
(a)through-
(i)being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities or financial
instruments to which the inside information relates ;
In terms of the above section, all the persons who will naturally be concerned with an
MBO are insiders since they include directors and employees. The Insider Trading Act
1998 Section (2) states:
"Subject to section 4 (1), any individual who knows that he or she has information and
who-
181 An example of an MBO involving empowerment partner is Nampak selling a stake to some managers.
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(a) deals directly or indirectly, for his or her own personal account or for any person, in
the securities or financial instruments to which such information relates or which are
likely to be affected by it :
(b)encourages or causes another person to deal or discourages or stops another person
from dealing in the securities or financial instruments to which such information relates
or which are likely to be affected by it; shall be guilty of an offence.
(2)Subject to 4(2) any individual who knows that he or she has inside information and
who discloses that information to another person, shall be guilty of an offence.
From the above, I submit that not only listed companies can cause insider trading but also
unlisted entities. 182 The Insider trading Act 1998 extends the meaning of security to those
that are not traded in a regulated market but to any security that has similar characteristics
to those traded on the regulated market. 183 It will mean that whether a company is listed
or not, in a management buyout situation its managers can cause insider trading.
The fact that managers of a company are involved in the entity bidding for it is sufficient
to discourage other bidders. The other bidders immediately sense their disadvantage in
terms of the information the managers know which they do not. This can cause those
bidders not to bid and the price lessens as competition for bidding drops. With the
reduced competition, the bidder composed of the managers of the target, trying to buyout
then has the bargaining power to undervalue the company so as to pay the lowest possible
price for it. The solution to this sort of scenario will be to insert a clause in the sale of
182 The insider trading Act of 1998 defmes securities as instruments or rights bearing substantially or
similar characteristics to such securities dealt with in a regulated market.
183 ibid
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business agreement to recover money from the purchaser if he makes an over profit
. h' 184above a certaIn percentage on t e transactIon .
Leverage and management buyouts as methods of financing acquisitions has just began
amongst empowerment companies. Nozala the investment group bought Fedics (the
catering group) by a leverage buyout. Some managers in Nampak bought a stake in the
packaging company by a management buyout185.
5.2.2 Advantages of LBOs and MBOs for Empowerment Companies.
It is likely that the problem of raising capital and finding security by black businesses
will not be solved in the short term. The use of a target company's assets as security for
loans to buy a stake in acquisitions makes for a good sense. I submit that rather than
floating shares of state parastatals like Telkom on the stock exchange to privatise it, a
stake in the company could be sold using this method of finance. This will put ownership
in black hands as reasonable terms of paYment can be negotiated with the government for
the assets bought than with privately owned companies. This will also avoid the situation
where after the privatisation of a parastatal, only a small fraction ends up with the
previously disadvantaged people as was the case with Airports Company South Africa
where a huge part was sold to the Italians.
It is further submitted in conclusion to this point that if government has to empower
through privatisation this is the route to take. Few or no black companies can raise the
necessary capital to buy stakes in the parastatals that are going to be privatised. 186
184 S Kaplan. "Management Buyouts" New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance at page 638.
185 Interview with the MD ofNozala and Business map Empowerment 2000 report.
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As concerns management buyouts managers who buyout their companies end up as
owner managers. This provides a is good incentive to manage companies properly as any
careless losses are losses that would have ended up as dividends for them. It could
therefore be argued that, a management buyout should bring in better standards of
management.
5.2.3 Disadvantages.
Companies that are acquired by buyouts depend on debt for capital. This is a serious issue
as it causes a strain in terms of repaying and servicing the debt such that the company
could fail.
Because the capital is debt capital and there is need to continue servicing the debt, the
calibre of managers necessary to run these companies are supposed to be extremely
efficient and experienced. There is a shortage of this type of managers amongst black
companies owing to historical factors.
186 Should fair valuation of these parastatals go on and from the experience in the market potraying a lack
of capital for black business. . '
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Chapter 6
THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ON BLACK ECONOMIC
EMPOWERMENT
The role of the government on Black Economic Empowerment is still a much debated
Issue. 187 This debate has largely been centered around coordination, implementation, and
. . f h 188monltonng 0 t e process.
In order to understand the government's point of view it is necessary to go beyond the
laws that have been promulgated to the political agenda of the present African National
Congress (ANC) government.
This agenda spun out of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). This
agenda sought to implement through a "people centered approach" which centered
around human needs and a "people driven approach" which sought sustainability of
empowerment l89• This government seeks in its empowerment policies to empower
previously disadvantaged people through skills transfer, job creation and provision of
finance to conduct business, irrespective of technical competence. It seeks to seeks by
all means to force the previously disadvantaged people through this into the economy.
6.1 Implementation
The aforementioned political ideology translated into law is seen in the number of new
laws that have been promulgated and what the government wishes to promote. This
process is called juridification. Professor Rycroft defines juridification as
187 ISikhakhane " A rumbling from behind the scenes" Financial Mail 29 September 2000
188 Black Economic Empowerment" Hat trick needed" Financial Mail 29 September 2000
189 Black Economic Empowerment Committee Draft Report at page 44.
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"the use of law by the state to 'steer' social and economic life in a particular direction by
limiting the autonomy of individuals or groups to determine their own affairs. 190 Chiefly
in this context is the Employment Equity Act of 1998, the Skills Development Act, the
Preferential Procurement Act and the Competition Act of 1998. These laws have had the
effect of forcing the use ofpreviously disadvantaged individuals into the economy by
way of employment and ownership of stake holds in enterprises. The extent to which this
succeeds is linked to the extent to which these laws are enforced. A typical area to
look at is employment equity. Fines proposed in terms of the Employment Equity
Act191which were due in terms of a deadline scheduled for June 1999 were not issued.
This fine was to be imposed on all designated employers l92 who did not submit an
Equity Plan by that date. This has prejudiced all the other employers who submitted the
Employment Equity plan by the deadline. This is so because those who drew employment
equity plans and adopted affirmative action policies have had to employ lesser skilled
people, incurred costs of training them, spent time and resources negotiating with trade
unions while their colleagues or competitors who did not follow these practices remain
unfined, gained by using their skilled employees and were generally more competitive in
business. Lack of action by the government has also slowed employment equity as a
process since defaulters have gone with impunity.
On the other hand though, one finds that there are a number ofjoint ventures and
partnerships between previously disadvantaged individuals and white owned businesses
in fields where the main businesses depend on licenses or tenders. 193 Without these joint
190 A Rycroft "Obstacles to employment equity?: The role of judges and arbitrators in the interpretation
and implementation of affIrmative action policies". Vol 20 ILJ 2000 at 1411.
191 Section 20
192 See section 1 of the Employment Equity Act, footnote 18
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ventures these consortia will be unable to show commitment to transformation and black
economic empowerment and will not get these contracts or tenders. This situation occurs
because those who award licenses and tenders are part of the government or can be
influenced to implement government policy. It can be said that had the government
implemented the employment equity laws more strictly, more would have been achieved.
The other area where the government seems to be falling short is that of coherency in the
implementation of Black Economic Empowerment. 194The first noticeable downside in the
implementation is that there is no monitoring body for black economic empowerment and
the Black Economic Empowerment Committee that was formed has no power at all
except to make recommendations195. It becomes difficult to deal with problems that arise
in the process of BEE without a body in charge of co-odinating and monitoring its
progress. An example of the fallout of incoherency can be seen in the gambling industry.
The Gambling Act 1996 stipulates that only 40 casino licenses can be issued in the
Republic. 196 Prior to the issuing of the new casino licenses there were numerous
independent casino operators. Most of these operators cannot compete with the bigger
consortia. In the whole of South Africa the various provincial gambling boards have
granted licenses to various combinations of consortia under different company names but
with essentially the same partner. 197 The partners in these casino ventures are all big
193 Joint ventures like Afrisun in the Casino industry, Vulindlela in the construction industy depended on a
state contract to develop the point area in Durban, Cell C and others.
194 Black Economic Empowerment commission Report at page 202.
195 See terms of reference of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission at page 1 supra.
196 Section 13 (1) of the Gambling Act 1996
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groups. Meanwhile the smaller operators have been forced by law to close down their
businesses as they do have licenses to operate. Clearly this is a monopoly that is being
created by the government through in-coherency in the implementation of its policies. No
provision was given in the National Gambling Act 1996 for the smaller operators nor was
any consideration given to their activity. Their businesses were made redundant and their
capital in the form of gambling machinery is lost as there is nothing to do with it.
From a constitutional point ofview the rights of this people to economic activity198 seems
to be violated in the sense that they cannot carry out their chosen businesses. It can be
argued in the light of the case ofS v Lawrence199 that gambling is a dangerous activity
that necessitates special regulation and that licenses are a necessary requirement to
regulate not only the activity, but where and how it should be conducted.
In distinguishing the situation of the small "illegal" casino operators to that of the
respondents in the Lawrence Case, it is important to note that liquor licenses which were
part of the issue in the Lawrence Case, are not limited in number. In the
Lawrence Case it is pointed out that 200measures which restrict a market as contemplated
in Section 26(2) will be justifiable. Examples of such protected markets pointed out there
will be the transport industry ( rail and air), telecommunications and broadcasting.
Section 26(2) of the constitution reads:
"Subsection (1) shall not preclude measures designed to promote the protection or the
197 An example here is the Sun International group that is present in almost every province in the country as
a partner in a casino venture.
198 Section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
199 1997(4) SA 1176
200 at 1180B-D
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improvement of the quality of life, economic growth, human development, social justice,
basic conditions of employment, fair labour practice or equal opportunity for all,
provided such measures are justifiable in an open democratic society based on freedom
and equality."
Chaskalson P, went on to say that the appellants in the Lawrence Case
"will have to establish that that they have been denied the right to engage 'freely' in the
11· f 1· " 201se lng 0 lquor.
In one ruling the Constitutional Court has found that the limitations placed on the
number of casino licences issued is reasonable. 202 However the fate of the small operators
in that field is uncertain as they stand at a risk ofbeing excluded out of the market.
The second area where a lack of coherency is affecting the impact of Government on
empowerment is in privatisation activities. This could be one of the methods of
redressing the imbalances of the past in terms of how state assets are going to be
privatised. The absence of a body in charge of empowerment to coordinate, has led to
the absence of a privatisation empowerment plan. The absence of this sort ofplan will
probably mean that blacks may not benefit from empowerment as they should.
An important debate in the role the government should be playing in BEE is how to
finance black owned business.203 The National Empowerment Fund Act was passed to
help the process of finance with the National Empowerment Fund as a body to provide
much needed capital for small businesses. The National Empowerment Fund was to hold
201 S v Lawrence 1997(4) SA 1176 at 1194£
202 Grand Slam Entertainment centre v Minister Veiligheid en Sekuriteit en Andere 1996(2) BCLR 213 (0)
203 ISikhakane supra
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shares in privatized entities which later would be transferred to private hands. The
National Empowerment fund was also to provide startup capital for small businesses. The
problem is financing the fund itself and managing it as both these processes are quite
complicated.204
The perception that previously disadvantaged borrowers are big credit risks still persists
and nothing has been done to counteract this perception.205 This has led to discrimination
of previously disadvantaged creditors in their search for capital.206There has not been any
action by the government to entice financiers to fund black businesses. The approach
used to lure white owned businesses to employ blacks in the employment equity Act
cannot work in financing as financing involves creating a contract between the
borrower and the lender.
In the present circumstances therefore tax incentives would seem to be appropriate.
In dealing with financing empowerment it should always be borne in mind that the
funding should go to areas where the majority ofpeople can participate in small
businesses. Investors should for example enjoy a tax incentives for investing in black
owned small businesses and there should also be tax incentives for certain areas of the
country which are very poor. In that way the financial community will be persuaded to
get involved in such deals as they themselves will benefit.207
There has been considerable debate about the necessity for new legislation on
the subject of empowerment.208 However I submit that there should be more focus on
204 Black Economic Empowerment Draft Report at 65.
205 Black Economic Empowerment Commission Draft Report at page 69 to 70
206 Gp Cit at 70.
207 Op cit at 66
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implementation of the existing laws rather than a rush to introduce new legislation. New
legislation, no matter how good cannot be of any use unless it can be effectively
implemented. If there is any thing that needs to be done, some of the existing legislation
can be amended and a body created with some teeth to give effect to what the new laws
stipulate and to monitor progress.
6.2 Political Stability
One issue that cannot be left out of a discussion concerning investor protection is
political stability and consideration of government policy.
Firstly, with political stability, South Africa is now a stable country politically.
What should be of concern to any investor here is whether the possibility exists that it can
degenerate into the situation of its neighbours. It is clear that if the issue ofblack
economic empowerment is not dealt with properly not only by the government but also
by the private sector, the danger of instability lurks. Perhaps the government should
consider reparations for victims of apartheid to deal with this aspect. This is because the
perception will always persist in the minds of the victims of apartheid that they may take
what they believe is rightfully theirs legally or illegally. A proper reparation plan could
do away with this perception.
Secondly the predictability of government policies and how they might affect business is
necessary for the conduct ofbusiness activity by investors. The inability of most
companies to predict that a change in government was going to affect their contract
208 Black Economic Empowerment Commission Conference 29th and 30th September 2000.
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supply lines led to some of these companies being placed in debt. 209 A timely release of
policy changes that can affect businesses will boost investor confidence in the system.
Even at the scale of municipal elections, the minor changes in the power rungs of a city
council have the effect of distorting business relationships between the municipality and a
business entity.
209 B' M Eusmess ap rnpowennent 1999 at 14
81
Chapter 7
COMPARING BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT IN THE CORPORATE
SECTOR WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
Although there has been concepts like economic empowerment and affirmative action in
other jurisdictions like the United States and Malasia, it is submitted that it would be a
mistake to import wholesale concepts from one jurisdiction into South Africa to cope
with the post apartheid situation. I will make an effort to compare situations that are
similar in nature to South Africa's situation not necessarily from countries that have used
concepts like affirmative action and economic empowerment but also from other
transitional economies like the Eastern block countries.
7.1 Comparison with the United States.
The concept of affirmative action seems to have emanated from the US, to improve the
lives of African Americans. Within a year of its implementation, the number of
businesses owned by African Americans tripled. Affirmative action in the corporate
sector was boosted by the reservation of a quarter system for African American
businesses similar to the effect being generated by the Employment Equity Act of 1998
and the Preferential Procurement Acts. These are all commendable efforts.21o
However unlike in South Africa, the situation of African Americans was different to that
of South Africans in several respects.
They were a minority as opposed to being a majority, the US government has more
economic resources than its South African counterpart, the historically black educational
210 In Fullilove v Klutznick 448US 448(1980) The United states Supreme court ruled that it was not
unconstitutional that 10 % of federal funds granted for local and public work must be used by the state or
local grantees to procure serVices from businesses owned and controlled by minority group members.
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institutions in the US had far greater standards in comparison with historically white
institutions in South Africa compared to the difference in educational standards between
historically black educational institutions in South Africa and the historically white
institutions here in South Africa.
Further more the focus of the US government was never in trying to put assets in the
hands of the historically disadvantaged. Its focus was on skills and educational
development.
Dealing with a small minority ofpeople is easier than dealing with the majority. In south
Africa, the government is under more pressure to deliver empowerment. Coupled with
the fact that the resources available to it are very limited. The training facilities available
to the US government in that it has more money and a majority of its population being
skilled to help in the transformation process makes their task very different and simpler
compared to that of the government of South Africa. Even with these advantages, the US
government has had to fight claims that it is discriminatory in its practices towards the
majority?11 It is very necessary to note that prolonged affirmative action and
empowerment policies for the benefit of the majority in the long term will be seen as
harsh discrimination and exclusion of the minority.
7.2 Comparison With Malaysia.
A frequently cited example of empowerment policies in the international scene is
Malaysia. There was colonisation and not apartheid in that country. The empowerment
policies that were implemented were in favour of the Bumiputra or local Malay people
who were the majority in that country but had been left at the outskirts of the economy.
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This was done in tenns of a program called the New Economic Plan.
Unlike the US and South Africa, Malaysia had a significant foreign intervention by the
World Bank and other foreign investors to kick start a boom in their economy.
The areas of focus were education and a significant refonn in the banking sector
212
.The
focus in education there led to an easier technology transfer to the local population. The
policies of affinnative action there were in favour of the local Bumiputra people. Part of
the fortune of the Bumiputra people is that this era was accompanied by the oil boom.
Comparatively speaking, the situation of the Bumiputra people is far from that of South
Africans. In should be noted that the empowennent process in Malasia was driven by
the government. Its government was courageous to take refonns in sectors where the
South African government has not ventured in all these years of transfonnation namely
the Banking and Finance sector of the economy. Apart from Laws that necessitate white
businesses in this country to enter into joint ventures with black owned businesses, there
has been no measure enticing the Banking and Finance industry to finance empowennent
transactions at the SMME level. Unlike the Malaysian situation where this led to a rapid
growth in the number of small businesses, the absence of intervention in this sector, is
slowing down empowennent in South Africa.
A centrally driven approach to education is absent in not in effort but in the funding of
education and training initiatives. The negative side of the situation in Malaysia is that if
the preferential treatment of the previously disadvantaged is kept on for too long, it
breeds window dressing schemes213 .
212 B· M "A I . 1P . Eusmess ap, n ntematlOna erspectIve on mpowerment" Empowerment 2000 at 40
213 KA Johnston " AffIrmative Action: A necessary clause in the Bill of Rights or mere reverse
Discrimination, 1996
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7.3 Comparison With The Eastern Block Countries
Although there was no apartheid in the fonner Eastern block countries and there was no
racial or class discrimination there are striking elements there to the situation in South
Africa. These similarities come fonn a skills point of view and a capital point of view. In
the communist system that existed in these states there was no question of ownership as
everything belonged to the state. The absence of such ownership rights is very similar to
that of apartheid South Africa where blacks were denied these rights. The lack of
ownership rights in a system definitely creates problems if that system with no property
rights is transfonned to a capitalist system. When individuals in such a society decide to
invest in companies, access to funds become extremely difficult as they do not have
funds and cannot raise funds by debt since they do not own property to use as collateral
security for shares. The second problem here is in their management skills. Under both
the communist and apartheid system ( in the black sectors) there was no real commercial
activities going on, such that those who developed under these systems cannot be
expected to perfonn well under the capitalist system as skilled managers will.
It is worthwhile looking at how businesses are run in the fonner communist states as
guided to what can happen in south Africa.
The first aspect that comes to mind is privatization. In the fonner Eastern block countries
with the end of communism, there has been a lot ofprivatization going on. However the
process has to be regulated to avoid collusive bidding as competition for bids in the
industries being sold are very 10W.214 This has been the case in some sectors for the
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In commenting on the transition economies and specifically on what direction corporate
governance in these companies should take, Miwa and Ramseyer compared the
companies in transition economies to those in the pre war Japanese cotton and textile
Industry.216 According to these commentators, the experience in Pre -War Japan was that
the firms that had used less debt capital, corporate structures that constrained shareholder
power, and attracted only shareholders who were top professionals adding value to the
firm and who will monitor the firm were allowed to join. These successful firms avoided
large institutional investors who used the company only for their own gain.
217
With
respect I submit that while some of these policies are necessary for good corporate
governance, because of the inability of the government of South Africa to provide
funding for empowerment businesses, it will be necessary to include large institutional
investors on their own terms as there is very limited source of financing empowerment
deals. One may also argue that shareholders who add value to their respective enterprises
come at a price be they top professionals or not. Here I refer to my earlier argument that
the field of empowerment businesses is full of ex politicians who are being brought in
because of their political connections for the purpose of lobbying for contracts or
licenses. These type of shareholders will want a stake in the company less than the
average shareholder pays for theirs.
214 M Wright et al "Privatization and Buyouts in Central and Eastern Europe" New Palgrave dictionary of
Money and Finace.
215 S C .. L fJ .ee ompetltlon aw aspects 0 omt Ventures.
216 Y Miwa et al Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the pre -war Japanese
Coton Textile Industry. Jolin Center For Law Economics and Finance, Havard University.
217 Ibid at page 21
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CONCLUSION
There has been a tremendous effort by government evidenced by the new laws
promulgated to get black empowerment on track, which is quite commendable.
The new laws are necessary to achieve their empowerment objectives. However the
implementation of these laws is going to be more meaningful than just the existence of
these laws.218
In order to properly implement the new laws in a meaningful way in the process of
empowerment, I submit there must be constant evaluation of various benchmarks for
empowerment. The Black Empowerment Commission is in a good position to do this, but
it must have some teeth to intervene and not only recommend. Its first report came out in
the year 2000 which is appalling for a process that has been going on for at least seven
years. It is an indication that the empowerment process has been going unmonitored for
all these years.
Apart from evaluating the empowerment process, any commission in charge must take
corrective action in areas where monitoring shows the existence of drawbacks.
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